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Incarceration Incentives in the 
Decarceration Era 
Avlana K. Eisenberg* 
After forty years of skyrocketing incarceration rates, there are signs that 
a new “decarceration era” may be dawning; the prison population has leveled 
off and even slightly declined. Yet, while each branch of government has taken 
steps to reduce the prison population, the preceding decades of mass 
incarceration have empowered interest groups that contributed to the expansion 
of the prison industry and are now invested in its continued growth. These 
groups, which include public correctional officers and private prison 
management, resist decarceration-era policies, and they remain a substantial 
obstacle to reform. 
This Article scrutinizes the incentives of these industry stakeholders in 
the new decarceration era. Drawing on interviews with a wide range of industry 
actors, it develops a “taxonomy of resistance” to identify how and why these 
actors resist reform efforts and uncovers understudied parallels between private 
and public prison stakeholders. This fine-grained analysis grounds the Article’s 
recommendations for changes to compensation and assessment structures to 
better align industry incentives with decarceration-era goals. Ultimately, the 
future of the decarceration era is precarious but not doomed. The detailed 
incentives unearthed by this study demonstrate the significant hurdles facing 
emerging decarceration policies and the urgent challenge of accounting for, 
overcoming, and co-opting entrenched prison industry stakeholders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After four decades of skyrocketing incarceration rates,1 the 
prison population has finally plateaued and even very slightly 
 
 1.  The literature on the rise of mass incarceration is vast. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, 
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); MARIE 
GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 
(2006); IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION (Mary Pattillo et al. 
eds., 2004); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (2006); WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011); James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: 
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declined.2 It remains to be seen whether this is a temporary, recession-
fueled dip, a long-term equilibrium, or the beginning of a serious 
decline. The time is ripe, therefore, to examine whether this 
decarceration trend will continue and what response can be expected 
from the stakeholders who are most invested in the growth of prisons. 
It is common to attribute the rise of mass incarceration in the 
United States to the profit-seeking private sector and the emergence of 
a “prison-industrial complex.”3 As the AFL-CIO, the largest federation 
of trade unions in the United States, has suggested: “[O]ur nation’s 
profit-driven justice system is producing a level of mass incarceration 
that is anything but just.”4 Some private corporations do advocate for 
pro-incarceration policies,5 even describing prisons as a kind of 
“product”6 to be sold like “selling cars or real estate or hamburgers.”7 
But suggesting that mass incarceration is solely the result of corporate 
greed paints an incomplete picture. The private sector, while a 
significant force, constitutes only a portion of the U.S. prison industry. 
While the three largest private prison companies, which constitute 
more than 80% of the market for private prisons,8 together spend 
approximately $4.5 million per year on lobbying expenses,9 California’s 
public correctional officers’ union alone spends nearly $8 million 
 
Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21 (2012); see also LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERIKA PARKS, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, 3 
(2012), http:// www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus11.pdf [http://perma.cc/3GBP-DGMT]. 
 2.  ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2012: 
TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991–2012 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/ 
index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4842 [http://perma.cc/NUN9-D3JW]; see also Ryan King et al., U.S. 
Prison Population Declines for Third Consecutive Year, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/detail/news.cfm?news_id=1720 [http://perma.cc/ S546-XAPY] 
(detailing a “several year trend”). But see ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2013 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf [http://perma.cc/2ADY-
399E] (reporting a marginal increase in the 2013 state prison population, which was somewhat 
offset by a modest decrease in the federal prison population).  
 3.  See, e.g., Benjamin Inman, The Prison Doors Swing Both Ways: Elite Deviance and the 
Maintenance and Expansion of the Market of Prison-Industrial Complex, in PRISON 
PRIVATIZATION: THE MANY FACETS OF A CONTROVERSIAL INDUSTRY 95, 103 (Byron Price & John 
Morris eds., 2012). 
 4.  Resolution 17: Prisons and Profits—The Big Business Behind Mass Incarceration, AFL-
CIO (Sept. 2013), http://www.aflcio.org/About/Exec-Council/Conventions/2013/Resolutions-and-
Amendments/Resolution-17-Prisons-and-Profits-The-Big-Business-Behind-Mass-Incarceration 
[http://perma.cc/BR9M-FJE6]. 
 5.  See infra Section III.A. 
 6.  Eric Bates, Private Prisons, THE NATION (1997), http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/ 
media/thenation_0105bate.htm [http://perma.cc/6ZUZ-CN9Z]. 
 7.  Id. (quoting Thomas Beasley, co-founder of Corrections Corporation of America). 
 8.  E.g., Christopher Petrella, The Color of Corporate Corrections, 3 RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY, 
Winter 2014, at 81, 83, n.9. 
 9.  Infra notes 213–17 and accompanying text. 
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annually on political activities.10 Because of their political clout, officers’ 
unions historically have been able to mobilize widespread support for 
their aims.11 Support for the prison industry turns out to be widespread 
and tenacious, even among those who oppose mass incarceration, when 
it serves their financial or political interests. For example, Senator 
Durbin, a vocal critic of mass incarceration,12 recently trumpeted his 
support for the opening of Thompson Prison, calling it “a significant 
investment in the economic future of northern Illinois.”13 
There is strong and deep opposition to the nascent decarceration 
trend. This Article explores how public and private prison industry 
stakeholders—those who staff, manage, and operate prisons—have 
contributed to the expansion of the prison population and in what ways 
they are resisting prison reform efforts.14 Contemporary prison reform 
efforts, which this Article refers to as “decarceration-era goals,”15 focus 
on achieving one or more of the following: reduction of the prison 
 
 10.  JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT: POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE PRISON OFFICERS 
UNION IN CALIFORNIA 220 (2011).  
 11.  Infra Section II.A. 
 12.  Senator Durbin was a co-sponsor of the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014, an effort to 
reduce the use of mandatory minimum sentences. S. 1410, 113th Cong. (2014). Durbin has also 
been a strong critic of solitary confinement and called the first congressional hearing on the subject 
in 2012. Press Release, Durbin Chairs First-Ever Congressional Hearing on Solitary Confinement 
(June 19, 2012), http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID =7d4f1128-
4d15-4112-aa48-5315cb395142 [http://perma.cc/ABR3-FK3U]. 
 13.  Press Release, Durbin Statement on New Job Openings For Thomson Prison (Apr. 4, 
2014), http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=64bdd25a-67da-41f0-
9c9c-ac716ba68ce9 [http://perma.cc/QR5R-QU7V]. 
 14.  A rich theoretical literature has examined the economic theory of interest groups. E.g., 
Daniel Farber & Philip Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987); 
see also, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS (1965); Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). For a discussion of how 
this literature can be applied to mitigating resistance to institutional reform, see MICHAEL 
TREBILCOCK, DEALING WITH LOSERS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLICY TRANSITIONS 32 (2013). 
Trebilcock critiques Louis Kaplow for his presumption against engaging the “losers” in policy 
transitions, Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 
(1986), and Richard Epstein for his presumption that “losers” in policy transitions should 
necessarily be compensated, RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). Id. at 75–76. Trebilcock strives for a middle ground, stressing that those 
prone to resisting reform need to be engaged in order to avoid policy stasis, and that the larger 
social goals must be kept in focus to avoid being overly deferential to the interests of those who 
would resist change. Id. This Article takes a similar approach, investigating the incentives of 
prison industry stakeholders in order to engage these stakeholders and to better align their 
incentives with reform goals. See infra Section IV.B. 
 15.  The term “decarceration era” is meant to capture the shift in policy demonstrated by 
high-level court, legislative, and executive decisions. However, questions of how long this era will 
last, and how much reduction in the nation’s prison population it will achieve, remain open. 
Importantly, even this “decarceration era” is still an era of mass incarceration; that is, it would 
take many years of decline to return even to the incarceration rate of 1980. See infra note 102.  
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population, improved prison conditions, and preparation for successful 
reentry into mainstream society.16 
The incentives of prison industry actors in both the public and 
private sectors are underexplored.17 Scholars who address the 
burgeoning private prison sector have focused on the legitimacy18 and 
comparative efficiency19 of private institutions rather than on overlaps 
between incentives in the private and public sectors.20 Many of these 
discussions point to the flaws of one sector while idealizing the other.21 
In some accounts, the profit-seeking private sector is pitted against a 
 
 16.  Since reoffenders comprise a huge fraction of prison admissions, the goal of successful 
reentry (and of a reduction in recidivism rates) is crucial to the decarceration enterprise. 
Furthermore, since high rates of incarceration have resulted in overcrowded facilities with poor 
conditions, the goal of reducing the prison population and that of improving conditions are strongly 
related. Overcrowding, PENAL REFORM INT’L, http://www.penalreform.org/priorities/ prison-
conditions/overcrowding/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2015) [http://perma.cc/W9J3-SWDY]. By addressing 
these three related decarceration-era goals in tandem, this Article responds to the critique, voiced 
recently by Jonathan Simon, that for purposes of analysis, the “quantitative explosion” of prison 
inmates and the “qualitative implosion” in prison conditions and treatment of prisoners “have 
remained largely apart.” JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE 
COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 7 (2014).  
 17.  See infra Section I.C. This Article uses incentives in a broad sense, including both 
external reward structures and also what actually motivates people, as gleaned through deduction 
as well as through their self-reports and reports about what they have observed and experienced 
of the industry. 
 18.  See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 438 
(2005) (discussing legitimacy standards); Richard Sparks, Can Prisons Be Legitimate? Penal 
Politics, Privatization, and the Timeliness of an Old Idea, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 14, 14 (1994) 
(discussing the problem of legitimacy directly, rather than implicitly); Alexander Volokh, 
Privatization and the Elusive Employee-Contractor Distinction, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 133 
(2012) (discussing how private contractors may lack legitimacy); Ahmed White, Rule of Law and 
the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in Jurisprudential Perspective , 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
111, 112 (2001) (discussing the effect that private prisons have on the relationship between the 
State and society).  
 19.  See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Developments in the Law – The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 1838, 1879–86 (2002) (discussing the historical evolution of incarceration strategies).  
 20.  The legitimacy inquiry yields a moral or philosophical discussion, while the comparative 
efficiency inquiry focuses on outcomes; both of these inquiries overlook the incentives of prison 
industry stakeholders and ways in which these incentives could influence institutional design 
reforms, increasing legitimacy and improving outcomes. On a practical front, a comparative 
efficiency approach is also problematic because prisoners rarely spend all of their time in one place 
and, given the transient nature of the population, it may be exceedingly difficult to find a control 
group. Telephone interview with Alex Friedmann, Managing Editor, Prison Legal News (Apr. 28, 
2014); see also Alexander Volokh, Prison Accountability and Performance Measures, 63 EMORY L.J. 
339, 343 (2013) (favoring a comparative efficiency approach but lamenting the poor quality of 
existing comparative studies of private and public prisons). 
 21.  While this Article addresses the institutional design shortcomings of both public and 
private prisons, it does not mean to suggest that one or the other way of structuring prisons is 
inherently better or worse, but rather that understanding the incentives of prison industry 
stakeholders is indispensable to decisionmaking about the optimal design of either public or 
private prisons. 
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public sector free from financial motivations,22 while other accounts 
extol the virtues of private-sector efficiency as compared to a bloated, 
bureaucratic public sector.23 Meanwhile, when analyzing trends in the 
prison population, scholars tend to discuss the dominant influence of 
judges, policymakers, and prosecutors,24 approaching the prison 
industry as one that simply complies with legislative and judicial 
dictates. The focus on top-down dictates in the criminal justice system 
both ignores the full range of actors and incentives that comprise the 
industry and obscures principal-agent problems that may hinder 
implementation of law and policy reforms in both public and private 
sectors.25 
This Article’s fine-grained examination of the roles and 
incentives of key players in the prison industry begins to fill that gap, 
revealing not only how policy initiatives affect prison operations but 
also how prison operations may undercut the aims of policymakers.26 In 
doing so, this Article goes beyond accounts of the prison industry as a 
lobby that opposes reform efforts and also looks at ways the prison 
industry can frustrate on-the-ground implementation. The Article 
supplements existing research on prison industry incentives with a 
comprehensive review of publicly available materials—such as 
shareholder statements and lobbying reports27—as well as dozens of 
original interviews with representatives of key interest groups, 
including correctional officers’ union leaders, private prison managers 
 
 22.  See, e.g., Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 
38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149, 149 (2010) (discussing the government’s increased reliance on private 
prisons). Prison reform activists have also joined the anti-privatization chorus. See, e.g., Eric 
Bates, CCA, the Sequel, THE NATION (May 20, 1999), http://www.thenation.com/article/cca-sequel/ 
[http://perma.cc/K5RG-KWUH] (“We need to shut private prisons down . . . . The care and 
rehabilitation of prisoners is not consistent with the profit motive.”). 
 23.  See, e.g., Charles Logan & Sharla Rausch, Punish and Profit: The Emergence of Private 
Enterprise Prisons, 2 JUST. Q. 303, 304 (1985) (discussing the costly nature of the prison industry); 
Dennis Palumbo, Privatization and Corrections Policy, 5 REV. OF POL’Y RES. 598–605 (1986) 
(discussing the effect of privatization on corrections policy); E.S. Savas, Privatization and Prisons, 
40 VAND. L. REV. 889, 990 (1987) (discussing the increased reliance on private contracting in 
prisons).  
 24.  See, e.g., William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505 (2001) (describing the political system responsible for criminal law, which includes legislators, 
prosecutors, and judges, while highlighting the synergistic relationship—and thus dominance—of 
prosecutors and legislators).  
 25.  For an analogous discussion of principal-agent discontinuities in the context of hate 
crime law enactment and enforcement, see Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA 
L. REV. 858, 858 (2014).  
 26.  See, e.g., Donald Tibbs, Peeking Behind the Iron Curtain: How Law “Works” Behind 
Prison Walls, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 137, 139 (2006) (examining the inmate disciplinary 
process at the Fox Lake Correctional Institution in Wisconsin).  
 27.  I have also examined state contracts with private prison corporations obtained through 
Freedom of Information Act requests by In the Public Interest (on file with author). 
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and executives, prison reform advocates, department of corrections 
leaders, and others.28 These interviews supplement the written record 
with the insights of highly informed and influential leaders of various 
stakeholder groups,29 including a broad array of industry leaders from 
states with contrasting prison reform narratives—from those that 
recently closed prisons, to those that unsuccessfully attempted to close 
prisons; and from those that have lowered their prison populations, to 
 
 28.  Telephone Interview with Joe Baumann, Chapter President, Cal. Corr. Peace Officers 
Ass’n at Norco (May 23, 2014); Telephone Interview with Robert Blackmer, Political Action Comm. 
Sec’y, Ariz. Corr. Peace Officers Ass’n (July 25, 2014); Telephone Interview with Jonathan Burns, 
Spokesperson, Corr. Corp. of America (July 29, 2014); Telephone Interview with Les Cantrell, 
Statewide Coordinator, Fla. Teamsters Local 2011 (Aug. 4, 2014); Telephone Interview with 
Patricia Caruso, former Dir., Mich. Dep’t of Corrs. (July 15, 2014); Telephone Interview with 
Donald Cohen, Exec. Dir., In the Public Interest (April 8, 2014); Telephone Interview with Lili 
Elkins, Chief Dev. and Strategy Officer, Roca (July 28, 2014); Telephone Interview with David 
Fathi, Dir., ACLU Nat’l Prison Project (July 16, 2014); Telephone Interview with Ralph Fretz, Dir. 
of Assessment and Research, Cmty. Educ. Ctrs. (July 16, 2014); Friedmann interview, supra note 
20; Telephone Interview with Justin Jones, former Dir., Okla. Dep’t of Corrs. (Aug. 11, 2014); 
Telephone Interview with Jody Lewen, Exec. Dir., Prison Univ. Project (May 29, 2014); Telephone 
Interview with Lance Lowry, President of Huntsville Local Chapter, Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. and 
Mun. Emps. (July 15, 2014); Telephone Interview with Marc Mauer, Exec. Dir., The Sentencing 
Project (July 10, 2014); Telephone Interview with Terri McDonald, Chief, L.A. Cty. Jails, former 
Undersecretary, Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. and Rehab. (Aug. 12, 2014); Telephone Interview with Kate 
Miller, Program Dir., ACLU of Ky. (Aug. 13, 2014); Telephone Interview with Tani Mills, Chief of 
External and Legislative Affairs, Ctr. for Emp’t Opportunities (July 24, 2014); Telephone 
Interview with Ed Monahan, Pub. Advocate, Ky. Dep’t of Pub. Advocacy (July 30, 2014); Te lephone 
Interview with Christopher Petrella, Co-leader, Private Prison Info. Act Coal. (July 14, 2014); 
Telephone Interview with LeeAnn Prince, Dir., Corrs. Programs, Mgmt. and Training Corp. (Dec. 
11, 2013); Telephone Interview with Dennis Schrantz, former Deputy Dir. of Planning and Cmty. 
Dev., Mich. Dep’t of Corrs. (July 25, 2014); Telephone Interview with Don Spector, Dir., Prison 
Law Office (July 16, 2014); Telephone Interview with Marc Suvall, Volunteer instructor, Taconic 
Corr. Facility in Bedford Hills, N.Y. (Aug. 5, 2014); Telephone Interview with Terry Teetz, former 
Use of Force Specialist, Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice (Aug. 6, 2014); Telephone Interview with 
Arthur Townes, Dir. of Alumni Servs., Cmty. Educ. Ctrs. (July 22, 2014); Telephone Interview with 
Peter Wagner, Exec. Dir., Prison Policy Initiative, ACLU (July 16, 2014); Telephone Interview 
with A.T. Wall, Dir., R.I. Dep’t of Corrs. (July 25, 2014); Telephone Interview with Jerry Williams, 
Deputy Comm’r, Miss. Dep’t of Corrs. (Aug. 5, 2014); Interview with Jeffrey Beard, Sec’y, Cal. 
Dep’t of Corrs. and Rehab., in Salt Lake City (Aug. 16, 2014); Interview with Burl Cain, Warden, 
La. State Penitentiary at Angola, in Salt Lake City (Aug. 16, 2014); Interview with Matthew Cate, 
former Sec’y, Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. of Rehab., in Salt Lake City (Aug. 16, 2014); Interview with Jim 
Conway, former Superintendent, Attica Corr. Facility Prison, in Salt Lake City (Aug. 16, 2014); 
Interview with Cathy Fontenot, Assistant Warden, La. State Penitentiary at Angola, in Salt Lake 
City (Aug. 18, 2014); Interview with Michael Greer, Captain, Mecklenburg Cty. Sheriff’s Office, in 
Salt Lake City (Aug. 16, 2014); Interview with Randy Hill, Manager, Black Creek Integrated Sys. 
Corp., in Salt Lake City (Aug. 18, 2014); Interview with Debra O’Neal, Training/Educ. Adm’r, Del. 
Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, in Salt Lake City (Aug. 17, 2014); Interview 
with Bernard Rochford, Exec. Vice President, Oriana House Servs., in Salt Lake City (Aug. 18, 
2014); Interview with Mark Saunders, Vice President, The Nakamoto Grp., Inc., in Salt Lake City 
(Aug. 16, 2014). 
 29.  While these interviews inform the Article’s investigation of prison industry incentives, 
they are not meant to be representative of all industry actors. 
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those whose prison populations continue to rise.30 These interviews 
provide an in-depth look at prison industry actors and their incentives 
in a changing landscape. 
The Article focuses specifically on the incentives of public 
correctional officers31 and private prison management, highlighting 
significant points of overlap between public- and private-sector 
motivations, as well as significant areas of divergence within both 
public and private sectors. It highlights the role each of these groups 
has played in the expansion of the prison population. These groups are 
united by a dependence on prisons for their livelihood and a preference 
for prisons as a growth industry; they also represent the strongest, most 
vocal interests in their respective sectors. Both groups have worked to 
expand the prison population and have allied themselves with law 
enforcement and community groups that share their interests. The 
Article’s examination of these groups and their respective interests 
illuminates this convergence. It also demonstrates why scholars and 
reformers should complement their analysis of top-down reform efforts 
by examining the incentives of institutional actors who make on-the-
ground decisions such as contract negotiation, inmate discipline, and 
day-to-day implementation of prison reforms. 
The Article exposes the tensions that arise when these groups 
that have historically preferred (and worked toward) a growing prison 
population encounter widespread momentum for prison reform. It 
develops a “taxonomy of resistance”32 that reveals the different ways by 
which prison industry stakeholders may disrupt reform efforts focused 
 
 30.  Some states have experienced multiple narratives. For example, stakeholders in Florida 
and Michigan, among others, described the experience of successful prison closure as well as that 
of unsuccessful attempts to close prisons. See, e.g., Cantrell interview, supra note 28; Schrantz 
interview, supra note 28. 
 31.  The Article purposefully refers to “correctional officers” rather than “prison guards.” 
While the terms were used interchangeably among some industry stakeholders during the 
interviews, union websites refer to their membership as “officers” and one prominent corrections 
department leader insisted that it was “a sign of disrespect” to refer to someone as a “prison guard.” 
Wall interview, supra note 28. 
 32.  While the details of legislative enactments, judicial proclamations, and prison industry 
decisionmaking change on a day-to-day basis, it is crucial to develop tools to assess these changes 
and a conceptual framework to anticipate strains of resistance and to understand possible 
mitigating approaches. The broader literature on resistance to organizational change is also 
relevant. See, e.g., Carol Agocs, Institutionalized Resistance to Organizational Change: Denial, 
Inaction and Repression, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS 917, 917 (1997) (discussing available literature on 
organizational change); Michael Hannan & John Freeman, Structural Inertia and Organizational 
Change, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 149, 149 (1984) (describing internal and external factors that generate 
inertia in organizations); Kristin Kusmierek, Understanding and Addressing Resistance to 
Organizational Change (Apr. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~marvp/facultynetwork/whitepapers/kusmierekresistance.html 
[http://perma.cc/W969-7BXE] (discussing recommendations for organizational change). 
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on reducing the prison population, improving prison conditions, and 
promoting successful reentry. These modes of resistance include: (a) 
political activism through lobbying and alliances with other groups 
opposing prison closures and sentencing reforms; (b) discretionary 
decisions about discipline; (c) collusion between public and private 
actors toward the common goal of growing the prison industry; and (d) 
propagation of an “us versus them” mentality that dehumanizes 
inmates, thus impeding efforts to improve prison conditions and to 
promote rehabilitation. 
The Article’s detailed analysis of power centers in the prison 
industry unveils not only strong currents of resistance to decarceration-
era goals but also countervailing pressures that complicate the 
resistance story. For example, some prison industry stakeholders have 
begun adapting to decarceration efforts by finding business 
opportunities in the broader corrections industry (e.g., by investing in 
surveillance technologies) and by forming alliances with prison 
reformers to improve prison conditions. By scrutinizing early examples 
of prison industry adaptation to, and even cooperation with, 
decarceration-era goals, we can better understand and anticipate the 
role of institutional design in shaping the future contours of prison 
reform and the attitudes of prison industry stakeholders. 
The Article proposes four strategies that would better align 
prison industry incentives with the goals of the reform movement.33 It 
suggests that states (a) restructure contracts to decouple prison profits 
from the number of prisoners incarcerated; (b) invest in “pay for 
performance” schemes to reward positive outcomes; (c) diversify prison 
industry actors’ profit motives by encouraging companies and 
employees to invest in related industries with less dependence on 
incarceration; and (d) reconceptualize the function of prison work by 
altering the social norms that shape relationships among management, 
officers, and inmates. 
The prison industry is an archetypal example of an established 
industry preventing public-spirited reform because of the incentives of 
existing stakeholders. Drawing on incentive-based analyses of other 
sectors, this Article’s insights about overcoming resistance to reform in 
the prison context are applicable to efforts to reform institutions in 
industries as diverse as utilities, education, and health care.34 
 
 33.  These prescriptions take the incentives of prison industry actors into account and build 
on these incentives, avoiding the “inside/outside fallacy” that would juxtapose “deeply pessimistic 
accounts” of actors’ motivations with an “optimistic proposal that the same actors should supply 
public-spirited solutions.” Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1743 (2013).  
 34.  See infra Section IV.B 
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I contextualizes recent 
fluctuations in the prison population and reviews the academic 
literature in this area, exposing the need for sustained scholarly 
attention to the roles and incentives of key public and private industry 
stakeholders. Part II provides a fine-grained analysis of correctional 
officers (as represented by their unions) and private prison 
management, highlighting the incentives of these key groups and their 
shared preference for the further growth of prisons. Part III builds on 
this close examination of prison industry incentives, highlighting four 
modes of resistance by prison industry stakeholders to decarceration-
era goals. Part IV identifies some countertendencies and proposes 
further reforms to align industry incentives with decarceration-era 
goals. Ultimately, the Article argues that policymakers committed to 
reform must develop an affirmative strategy for decreasing 
opportunities for prison industry resistance and for co-opting prison 
industry actors as part of a decarceration coalition. The success of any 
such strategy will require taking into account the underlying incentives 
of key private and public prison industry stakeholders. 
I. MASS INCARCERATION AND THE POSSIBLE TURN TO DECARCERATION 
Part I details the shifting incarceration patterns and policies 
that have characterized both the lengthy period of mass incarceration, 
which began in the early 1970s, and recent decarceration efforts. After 
describing reasons for the unprecedented crisis of mass incarceration, 
it highlights recent shifts in priorities, budgetary and otherwise, that 
have created momentum for decarceration. It also discusses the current 
scholarship on the political economy of mass incarceration and its 
limitations, highlighting gaps in the literature that this Article begins 
to fill. 
A. Mass Incarceration and its Consequences 
The United States prison population experienced an explosion 
beginning in the 1970s, and the United States currently incarcerates a 
higher percentage of its population than any other country in the 
world.35 There were approximately 200,000 people incarcerated in the 
 
 35.  John Schmitt et al., The High Budgetary Cost of Incarceration, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC 
AND POLICY RESEARCH 1 (June 2010), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-
2010-06.pdf [http://perma.cc/99FQ-PU48]; see also PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: 
BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 5 (2008), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/ 
wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/sentencing_and_corrections/onein100pdf.pdf [http://perma.cc/G95D-
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United States in 1973,36 and the prison population surpassed 2 million 
in 2002.37 During this time, the per capita incarceration rate soared 
from 100 per 100,000 to more than 750 per 100,000.38 At its peak in 
2009, the U.S. prison population exceeded 2.4 million,39 with more than 
1% of the country’s adult population behind bars.40 The phenomenon of 
mass incarceration has disproportionately affected men and people of 
color, with black males experiencing the highest rates of incarceration; 
approximately one in nine black men age twenty to thirty-four is 
currently incarcerated, and one in three black men will at some point 
spend time in jail or prison.41 
Rising crime explains only a small fraction of this exponential 
increase in incarceration levels. While levels of violent crime and 
property crime rose in the 1970s and 1980s, peaking in the early 1990s, 
both violent crime and property crime declined after 1992.42 By 
contrast, incarceration rates continued to skyrocket, suggesting that 
rising crime is an insufficient explanation for the explosion of the prison 
population. 
The drastic increase in incarceration levels can better be 
explained by a bipartisan political movement beginning in the 1970s 
that was characterized by “tough on crime” rhetoric and the “war on 
drugs.”43 Republican and Democratic politicians seized on widespread 
 
NZZ9] (finding that the United States has 5% of the world’s population and 25% of the world’s 
prison population). 
 36.  JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2014). 
 37.  Paige Harrison & Allen Beck, Prisoners in 2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
BULLETIN 1 (July 2002), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p01.pdf [http://perma.cc/X7SZ-D2EN]. 
 38.  Schmitt et al., supra note 35, at 1. The international disparity is particularly stark when 
U.S. incarceration rates are compared with those of other OECD countries, whose median rate is 
102 per 100,000 people. Id. at 3. 
 39.  Joan Petersilia, Beyond the Prison Bubble, 35 WILSON Q. 52, 52 (2011). By contrast, from 
1930 through the early 1970s, the rate of incarceration was relatively stable, which gave rise to 
the “stability of punishment hypothesis.” Alfred Blumstein & Soumyo Moitra, An Analysis of the 
Time Series of the Imprisonment Rate in the United States: A Further Test of the Stability of 
Punishment Hypothesis, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 376, 376 (1979). 
 40.  PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 
(2009), http://www.convictcriminology.org/pdf/pew/onein31.pdf [http://perma.cc/7SCY-AQHN] 
(documenting the percentage of Americans under correctional supervision in 2008—more broadly 
construed to include not only incarceration but also probation and parole—as one of every thirty-
one adults (3.2 percent of the population or 7.3 million people)).  
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Schmitt et al., supra note 35, at 8 (explaining that, by 2008, violent crime levels had 
returned to the 1980 levels, and property crime levels had fallen well below the 1980 levels); see 
also Solomon Moore, Prison Spending Outpaces All but Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/us/03prison.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/6EYF-N6ER] 
(discussing the social and economic effects of high crime levels in previous years). 
 43.  See, e.g., John Conyers, The Incarceration Explosion, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 377, 379 
(2013) (discussing the causes of America’s high incarceration rate).  
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concern about increasing crime rates and supported far-reaching legal 
reforms. One contributing factor was the rise of powerful economic 
interests benefiting from the growth of prisons, which boosted these 
political trends and capitalized on the public’s fear of crime and their 
resulting openness to draconian criminal laws. These reforms included 
the abolition of parole and the adoption of harsher sentencing laws, 
including guideline schemes and statutory mandatory minimums.44 For 
example, “truth in sentencing” laws, which required that offenders 
convicted of violent crimes serve at least 85% of their sentence,45 not 
only produced their intended goal of uniform sentences but also 
dramatically increased the length of prison terms.46 So too did new 
“repeat offender” laws, such as California’s “Three Strikes” law that 
imposed a mandatory life sentence for a third offense.47 
As increasingly punitive mandatory sentencing regimes became 
popular, the function of parole (in those jurisdictions that retained the 
early release option) also began to change. In 1976, Maine abolished 
parole for all inmates and, by 1998, fourteen states had followed suit.48 
Even in states that did not abolish parole, many restricted its use and 
significantly reduced parole boards’ discretionary authority.49 While 
parole and probation were once imagined as providing an alternative, 
community-based forum for transitioning back to society, and only 
parole violators perceived as dangerous would be returned to prison, 
increasingly, offenders found in violation of administrative procedures 
 
 44.  Id. at 379–80; Joan Peterselia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 
CRIME & JUST. 479, 492 (1999), http://canatx.org/rrt_new/professionals/articles/PETERSILIA-
PAROLE%20AND%20%20PRISONER%20REENTRY.pdf [http://perma.cc/TZ4K-RMM3] (“The 
pillars of the American corrections systems—indeterminate sentencing coupled with parole 
release, for the purposes of offender rehabilitation—came under severe attack and basically 
collapsed during the late 1970s and early 1980s.”). Additionally, some increase in the prison 
population can be attributed to the creation of new crimes and increased enforcement. Stuntz, 
supra note 24, at 513–14, 526.  
 45.  For an in-depth discussion of truth in sentencing laws and their impact on criminal 
justice stakeholders, see Joanna Shepherd, Police Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate 
Sentencing: The Truth About Truth-in-Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & ECON. 509, 511 (2002). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Anne Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 430 (2013) (noting 
that, by 1999, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia had established “truth-in-
sentencing” laws and twenty-four states had enacted “three strikes, you’re out!” laws). 
 48.  JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 65 
(2003). Federal parole was eliminated once the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s guidelines took 
effect in 1987. Conyers, supra note 43, at 380. 
 49.  Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and Population 
Trends, 26 CRIME & JUST. 63, 102 (1999) (explaining that “[t]he function of channeling people to 
prison increasingly took precedence over the provision of rehabilitative services”); Jeremy Travis 
& Sarah Lawrence, Beyond the Prison Gates: The State of Parole in America, THE URBAN INST. 12 
(Nov. 5, 2002), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310583_Beyond_prison_gates.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/HJ8Q-YQRD]. 
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were returned to prison.50 In fact, the rate of incarceration due to parole 
violations and revocation—what some scholars refer to as “back-end 
sentencing”51—has grown even faster than rates of incarceration over 
the last four decades. By 2007, the United States annually sent more 
people to prison for parole violations than it sent to prison for all 
reasons combined in 1980.52 Thus, the high rates of mass incarceration 
are not merely the result of new crimes; they also result from parolees 
returning to prison.53 
To address the soaring number of inmates, states and the federal 
government began contracting with private prison corporations,54 
further increasing the reach of the prison industry. Between 1990 and 
2009, the private prison industry grew by more than 1600%.55 The two 
largest private corporations—Corrections Corporation of America 
(CCA) and the GEO Group (GEO)—are traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange,56 and their most prominent investors include Fidelity and 
Vanguard mutual funds.57 While they have been touted as “one of the 
best investments,”58 providing “exceptional long-term returns,”59 
 
 50.  Caplow & Simon, supra note 49, at 108. In 1972, just .04% of parolees returned to prison 
for technical violations (such as missed appointments and breaking curfew); by 1987, 10% of 
parolees were reincarcerated for technical violations. Id. Additionally, the shift from discretionary 
decisionmaking by the parole board to mandatory release may have increased the likelihood that 
parolees are not adequately prepared for release and are more likely to “fail” parole and be 
reincarcerated. Travis & Lawrence, supra note 49, at 7.  
 51.  Jeffrey Lin et al., “Back-End Sentencing” and Reimprisonment: Individual, 
Organizational, and Community Predictors of Parole Sanctioning Decisions, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 759, 
760 (2010). Unlike “front-end sentencing” in court for the original crime, “back-end sentencing” 
does not impose a new court sentence; it merely re-imposes the original sentence. Id. 
 52.  Jeremy Travis, Back-End Sentencing: A Practice in Search of a Rationale, 74 SOC. RES. 
631, 631 (2007). 
 53.  See Lin et al., supra note 51, at 761.  
 54.  See, e.g., Byron Price & John Morris, The Environment of Private Prisons, in PRISON 
PRIVATIZATION: THE MANY FACETS OF A CONTROVERSIAL INDUSTRY 1, 4 (Byron Price & John Morris 
eds., 2012) (attributing the growth of private prisons to a synchronicity between “the continuous 
growth in the United States prison population and the neoliberal policies of the Reagan era, with 
its emphasis on free market solutions as the panacea to address government failure”).  
 55.  Am. Civil Liberties Union & Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tex., Warehoused and 
Forgotten: Immigrants Trapped in Our Shadow Private Prison System, 17 (June 2014), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/060614-aclu-car-reportonline.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
5H78-KGC2].  
 56.  NYSE:CXW (CCA); NYSE:GEO (GEO Group). 
 57.  Ray Downs, Who’s Getting Rich off the Prison-Industrial Complex?, VICE (May 17, 2013), 
http://www.vice.com/read/whos-getting-rich-off-the-prison-industrial-complex 
[http://perma.cc/XKK4-3KSS]. 
 58.  Ben Kramer-Miller, 2 Prison Stocks That Look Good: Corrections Corp, Geo Group, THE 
CHEATSHEET (Apr. 7, 2014), http://wallstcheatsheet.com/business/2-prison-stocks-that-look-good-
corrections-corp-geo-group.html/?a=viewall [http://perma.cc/85RF-NZDU] (“Over the past several 
years, one of the best investments has been in shares of prison owners and operators.”).  
 59.  Id. 
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private prisons have also come under attack as “warehousing human 
beings for profit”60 and as unaccountable to oversight due to their 
exemption from many of the regulations of government-operated 
prisons.61 Private prison boards of directors often include former state 
and federal corrections administrators.62 Private prison companies 
highlight the expertise that this provides to the private sector.63 
Detractors raise concerns about a revolving door, noting that private 
prisons may be gaining undue influence with politicians that could 
enable them to push their corporate agendas at the expense of public 
welfare.64 Aside from the two publicly traded companies, there are a 
number of smaller private companies, many of which have a regional 
focus.65 Despite their explosive growth, private prisons currently house 
only about 9% of U.S. inmates.66 However, the private sector also plays 
a substantial role in the operation of many public prisons; many aspects 
of prison life have been privatized, such as medical care, transportation, 
 
 60.  Todd K., Comment to 750 Activists Occupy Wells Fargo Branch in D.C., CARE2 (May 22, 
2012, 5:34 AM), http://www.care2.com/causes/750-activists-occupy-wells-fargo-branch-in-d-c.html 
[http://perma.cc/CW3F-B7X5]; see also Warehousing for Profit, PRISONEDUCATION.COM (July 2, 
2014), http://www.prisoneducation.com/prison-education-news/warehousing-for-profit.html 
[http://perma.cc/WHP9-73W5] (describing how private prison companies profit off of high 
incarceration rates in the United States). 
 61.  David C. Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1453, 1461–62 
(2010). 
 62.  See, e.g., Board of Directors, CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 
http://www.cca.com/board-of-directors [http://perma.cc/ZCE6-6U7V] (including board member 
Thurgood Marshall, Jr., former Cabinet Secretary to President Clinton; Chief Corrections Officer 
Harley Lappin, former Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons; and Chief Development Officer 
Tony Grande, former Tennessee Commissioner of Economic and Community Development). 
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Inman, supra note 3, at 103. 
 65.  E.g., LASALLE CORRECTIONS, http://www.lasallecorrections.com/ (last visited Oct. 17, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/NRM7-JJ78]. 
 66.  E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2012 40 
(2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf [http://perma.cc/GMU8-ZJBA]. This 
aggregated statistic includes about seven percent of state inmates and eighteen percent of the 
federal inmate population. Id.  
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and food service,67 leading to the perception of a contemporary “prison-
industrial complex.”68 
As the prison population has soared, there is increasingly a 
national market for prisoners. Inmates may be sent hundreds or even 
thousands of miles away from their families to wherever there happens 
to be beds available, a practice that takes its toll both on incarcerated 
individuals and on their families and communities.69 Indeed, mass 
incarceration has been shown to damage social networks, starting at 
the family level with financial and social costs, and then reverberating 
throughout entire communities.70 Of course, there is a complicated cost-
benefit analysis associated with imprisonment.71 In addition to the 
negative consequences, incarceration may reduce crime through 
deterrence as well as incapacitation.72 However, there is a growing 
consensus among policymakers and scholars that the growth of U.S. 
prisons has gone too far,73 and many policymakers are seeking to find 
ways to reduce incarceration.74 This Article assumes that some degree 
 
 67.  Carol Black, Grassroots Efforts Against Private Prisons, in 3 PRISON PRIVATIZATION, 
supra note 3, at 127, 131 (documenting the larger “pay to stay” phenomenon in prisons). Another 
example of the private-sector involvement in prisons is that, increasingly, money transfers to 
prisoners are handled through a private company. Thus, when family members want to deposit 
money for a prisoner, for example, so the inmate can pay for such necessities as toothpaste or toilet 
paper (which they increasingly are charged for), they now must make such transactions through 
JPay, a private company, which charges a $5 transaction fee for each $100 deposited to the 
inmate’s account. Id. 
 68.  See, e.g., Mike Davis, The Politics of Super Incarceration, in CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: 
CONFRONTING THE PRISON CRISIS 73, 73 (Elihu Rosenblatt ed., 1996) (describing a recent 
expansion of the California state prison system). 
 69.  Jeremy Travis et al., Families Left Behind: The Hidden Costs of Incarceration and 
Reentry, URBAN INSTITUTE 1 (Oct. 2003), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310882_families_ 
left_behind.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZJB7-X5RC] (describing the severe toll of incarceration on both 
the inmate and the inmate’s family members and dependents). 
 70.  Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African 
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281 (2004). 
 71.  See, e.g., David Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to 
Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905, 907–08 (2013) (illustrating that harm to society may be caused 
both by excessive incarceration as well as by insufficient imprisonment). 
 72.  Id. at 913. Weighing the costs and benefits of incarceration is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 73.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 8 (arguing that prisons create rather than prevent 
crime); SIMON, supra note 16, at 5 (arguing that mass incarceration constitutes “cruel and unusual 
punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND 
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 191 (2006) (finding that mass imprisonment has “sealed the social 
immobility of poor blacks” and subtracted from the civil rights gains previously achieved by African 
Americans). 
 74.  See, e.g., How to Safely Reduce Prison Populations and Support People Returning to Their 
Communities, JUST. POL’Y INST. 6 (June 2010), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/ upload/10-
06_FAC_ForImmediateRelease_PS-AC.pdf [http://perma.cc/GV4S-T7LY] (advocating methods to 
safely reduce prison populations). 
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of decarceration is a desirable goal. It leaves to other scholars the 
question of what level of incarceration is socially optimal. 
B. The Beginnings of Decarceration 
As crime rates have fallen, public discourse has shifted and a 
preoccupation with crime and fear of criminals has given way to 
widespread concerns about the astronomical financial and human costs 
of mass incarceration.75 For the first time since the United States prison 
population began its dramatic spike in the 1970s, the prison population 
decreased for three consecutive years, beginning in 2010.76 Some have 
proclaimed that the United States has entered the “beginning of the end 
of mass incarceration.”77 
Each of the three branches of government has played a role in 
building momentum for decarceration. Largely in response to fiscal 
crises, and capitalizing on political will,78 some legislatures have 
enacted early release bills and have begun to decriminalize low-level 
offenses such as marijuana possession.79 The Justice Department under 
President Obama proposed specific platforms to reduce overcrowding, 
such as revamping the system of mandatory minimum sentences to give 
more discretion to judges to mete out reduced sentences in some low-
level drug cases.80 And the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
 
 75.  Smart Reform is Possible, THE AM. C.L. UNION 6 (Aug. 2011), https://www.aclu.org/files/ 
assets/smartreformispossible.pdf [http://perma.cc/2ZWU-EPLD]; see also SIMON, supra note 16, at 
159 (referring to the “new common sense,” in which “the urge to imprison is counterbalanced” by 
fiscal and humanitarian concerns).  
 76.  King et al., supra note 2. According to the most recent Bureau of Justice Statistics report, 
in 2013, the state prison population increased by 4,300 prisoners (0.3%), but this increase was 
partially offset by a decrease in the federal prison population by 1,900 prisoners (0.9%), the first 
such decrease since 1980. CARSON, supra note 2, at 1. 
 77.  Erica Goode, U.S. Prison Populations Decline, Reflecting New Approach to Crime, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/us-prison-populations-decline-
reflecting-new-approach-to-crime.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/M8EG-QX69] (quoting Natasha 
Frost). Such optimism, however, may be premature. This era of decarceration could be very brief—
perhaps only until the dawn of better economic times or until the crime rate begins to rise again—
and it might not ultimately involve a substantial reduction in the prison population. This section 
thus details the factors that have contributed to the beginnings of decarceration without 
suggesting that this trend, without further intervention, is destined to continue. 
 78.  See, e.g., Cohen interview, supra note 28 (describing “a backlash against ‘tough on 
crime’ ” and a preference for “right on crime,” sparked by the bipartisan concern that “we’ve gone 
too far”); see also Mary D. Fan, The Political Climate Change Surrounding Alternatives to 
Incarceration, 38 HUM. RIGHTS 6, 6 (2011) (noting that the recession made avoiding discussion of 
the costs of incarceration unavoidable). 
 79.  Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1070 
(2015). 
 80.  Ryan J. Reilly, Eric Holder Outlining New Justice Department Drug Sentencing Reforms, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 12, 2013, 12:39 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/ 12/eric-
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overcrowding in California prisons—the largest state prison system in 
the country—was unconstitutional.81 The combination of legislative 
concerns about the fiscal pressures of mass incarceration in a period of 
economic crisis and judicial concerns about the humanitarian 
consequences of prison overcrowding,82 such as substandard inmate 
medical care,83 has resulted in a spate of reforms. 
Some states have embarked on broad-based sentencing and 
corrections reform, including reconsideration of the use of mandatory 
penalties.84 Twenty-three states have passed laws repealing mandatory 
minimums or revising them downward for certain offenses.85 Most of 
these changes affect nonviolent offenses, the vast majority of which are 
drug-related.86 There is some evidence that states that have revised or 
eliminated mandatory minimums, as well as applying these changes 
retroactively to those already serving their sentences, have seen 
reductions in prison population and costs.87 Additionally, some states 
 
holder-drug-sentencing_n_3741524.html [http://perma.cc/BB9Q-ZGK2]; see also Sari Horwitz, 
U.S. to Push for Early Release of More Federal Prisoners , WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-to-push-for-early-release-of-more-
federal-prisoners/2014/01/30/cead046e-89c5-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/CHM8-DQMK] (discussing the administration’s call for the early release of more 
nonviolent drug offenders). 
 81.  Brown v. Plata, 131 S.  Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).  
 82.  Justice Kennedy, who authored the 5-4 majority opinion, expressly referred to the 
“human dignity” owed prisoners, concluding that “[a] prison that deprives prisoners of basic 
sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity.” 
Id. at 1928. 
 83.  Id. at 1923. 
 84.  Ram Subramanian & Ruth Delaney, Playbook for Change? States Reconsider Mandatory 
Sentences, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 198, 198 (2014).  
 85.  See Mandatory Minimums: Reforms in Other States, FAMM 1–2 (July 10, 2015), 
http://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Mandatory-Minimums-Reforms-in-other-states-7-
10-15.pdf [http://perma.cc/3FJV-AEYG]. States have taken one of three different approaches to 
reforming mandatory penalties. These approaches include: (1) enhancing judicial discretion by 
creating “safety valve” provisions that keep the mandatory minimum penalty in place but allow a 
judge to bypass the sentence if he or she deems it inappropriate and if certain factual criteria are 
satisfied; (2) narrowing the scope of automatic sentence enhancements—laws that trigger sentence 
increases in specified circumstances, such as an offense occurring within a certain distance from a 
school or whether an offender has previous felony convictions; and (3) repealing the mandatory 
minimum laws or revising them downward for specified offenses, particularly in relation to drug 
offenses or first- or second-time offenders. Austin, supra, at 12–13; Eisen & James, supra, at 25–
26.  
 86.  See Austin, supra note 85, at 12–13 (cataloging states that have relaxed mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws). 
 87.  See, e.g., Stanford Law Sch. Three Strikes Project & NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 
Progress Report: Three Strikes Reform (Proposition 36): 1,000 Prisoners Released 2–3, 
http://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/child-page/441702/doc/slspublic/ 
Three%20Strikes%20Reform%20Report.pdf  [http://perma.cc/85M8-Y5SC] (evaluating 
California’s Proposition 36 of 2012, which revised the state’s 1994 Three Strikes Law, limiting the 
imposition of a life sentence to when the third felony conviction is serious or violent and 
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have increased opportunities for early release,88 such as by reinstating 
good-time credits that were eliminated in the “tough on crime” era.89 
States have also taken steps to reduce parole revocation.90 
On the federal level, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act in 
2010, reducing the controversial weight ratio of the amount of crack and 
powder cocaine needed to trigger mandatory sentencing from 100:1 to 
18:1, and eliminating the five-year mandatory minimum for first-time 
possession of crack.91 And in a speech to the American Bar Association 
in August 2013, Attorney General Eric Holder instructed U.S. 
Attorneys to refrain from using “draconian mandatory minimum 
sentences” in response to certain low-level, nonviolent drug offenses.92 
Alternative or “specialized” courts have also grown popular in 
recent years. These courts are designed to prioritize treatment and 
rehabilitation over incarceration, and they have attained widespread 
bipartisan support.93 There currently exist approximately three 
thousand such courts ranging from drug courts, which dominate the 
specialized court landscape, to domestic violence courts and mental 
health courts.94 
While a bird’s-eye view of the national prison population trends 
suggests reasons for optimism, a closer look at individual jurisdictions 
complicates the decarceration narrative, revealing tremendous variety. 
For example, while the fifty-state incarceration rate decreased for three 
consecutive years, the federal incarceration rate increased during this 
 
authorizing courts to resentence those serving life sentences under the old law). Since California’s 
Proposition 36 took effect, more than one thousand people have been released from prison, and, in 
the first nine months of implementation, the state saved more than $10 million. Id. 
 88.  See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 270–73 (McKinney 2015) (allowing for the conditional 
release of certain inmates); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 4504–06 (2014). 
 89.  See, e.g., Dawson Bell, Plan for Early Release in Granholm’s Budget to Face Steep 
Opposition, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 16, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://archive.wzzm13.com/news/ 
story.aspx?storyid=118547 [http://perma.cc/T4MU-NNJC] (describing Michigan’s early release 
reforms that estimated cost savings of $130 million). 
 90.  Jeremy Travis & Kirsten Christiansen, Failed Reentry: The Challenges of Back-end 
Sentencing, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 254 (2006). 
 91.  See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.  
 92.  Eric Holder, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association’s House of 
Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html 
[http://perma.cc/T7RR-CSDM]. 
 93.  Robert Wolf, A New Way of Doing Business: A Conversation About the Statewide 
Coordination of Problem-solving Courts, 2 J. OF CT. INNOVATION 191, 191, 206 (2009). But see Josh 
Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 783 (2008) (criticizing drug courts 
for “provid[ing] particularly poor results for the very defendants that they are intended to help 
most”). 
 94.  Allegra McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal 
Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1605–06 (2012). 
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time.95 Moreover, progress among states was uneven: for example, 
while incarceration decreased in New Jersey and New York, it 
increased in Louisiana and Alabama.96 
A state-by-state examination of incarceration trends also reveals 
the significance of the “California factor.” The Supreme Court’s recent 
holding that California’s prison system was unconstitutionally 
overcrowded97 resulted in a “realignment” plan that called for the 
diversion of thousands of nonviolent felons to county jails instead of 
state prisons.98 As a consequence of realignment, the state’s prison 
population has dropped considerably.99 While California was unable to 
meet the Court’s requirement that its prison occupancy rate be reduced 
to 137.5% of design capacity by 2013,100 the state was singlehandedly 
responsible for more than 50% of the recent prisoner population 
decrease.101 Because the current rate of decline in nationwide 
incarceration is so heavily driven by a single state’s response to an 
extraordinary court order (which may amount to a one-time decline), it 
is far from obvious that we should expect it to continue. Furthermore, 
even including the drop in California’s prison population, at the current 
rate of decline, the Sentencing Project estimates that it would take until 
the year 2101 to return to the incarceration rate that existed in 1980.102 
However, given decades of skyrocketing incarceration rates, a 
decarceration trend of any magnitude is notable and should motivate 
 
 95.  LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012 3, tbl.1 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
cpus12.pdf [http://perma.cc/4ES7-AZRW]. However, recent statistics reveal that in 2013 these 
federal and state trends were reversed. CARSON, supra note 2. Importantly, even as there has been 
movement to decrease sentences for low-level drug offenses, there has been a dramatic rise in 
immigration-related sentences in federal courts. Michael T. Light et al., The Rise of Federal 
Immigration Crimes, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/03/18/the-
rise-of-federal-immigration-crimes/ [http://perma.cc/5W3B-AR2F].  
 96.  E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2011 3 (2012), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf [http://perma.cc/7LRN-QPF3]. 
 97.  Brown v. Plata, 131 S.  Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).  
 98.  ASSEMB. B. 109, 2011 Assemb., 1st Exec. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (legislation signed by Governor 
Brown in response to the court order to reduce California’s prison population to 137.5% of 
capacity); GLAZE & HERBERMAN, supra note 95, at 5.  
 99.  CARSON & SABOL, supra note 96.  
 100.  Joan Petersilia, California Prison Downsizing and Its Impact on Local Criminal Justice 
Systems, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 333–34 (2014). At their overcrowding peak, California’s 
prisons were operating at more than 200% of their design capacity. Margo Schlanger, Plata v. 
Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 203 
(2013).  
 101.  For a comprehensive review of state prison population trends, see Peter Wagner, 
Tracking State Prison Growth in 50 States, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 28, 2014), 
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/overtime.html [http://perma.cc/8ZWM-JY7G]. 
 102.  King et al., supra note 2. 
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academics, policymakers, and reformers to investigate the ongoing 
financial, political, and cultural factors that could either enhance or 
thwart the continuation of this trend. 
C. The Political Economy of Mass Incarceration 
Scholarly accounts of the politics of incarceration tend to 
overlook the role of the prison industry. The dominant explanation used 
to account for the expansion of criminal liability and the growth of 
incarceration rates in the United States focuses on the role of 
policymakers and prosecutors.103 William Stuntz, among others, 
explored the incentives of these actors, demonstrating how legislators 
enact criminal laws in response to voter demand104 and how fear of 
crime has resulted in a dramatic increase in criminal liability and 
harsher sentences.105 Meanwhile, prosecutors respond to particular 
crimes, exercising their discretion to choose among tools provided by 
the legislature.106 Stuntz suggested that, because legislators and 
prosecutors together are incentivized to increase the reach of criminal 
law, the tide was unlikely to turn.107 However, countervailing 
concerns—such as state fiscal crises—complicate this picture and, as 
demonstrated above, policymakers have already taken steps to curb the 
prison population.108 Stuntz’s analysis neither anticipated the resulting 
spate of decarceration legislation nor addressed the role of the prison 
industry and possible bottom-up resistance to the legislative pursuit of 
decarceration-era goals. 
Meanwhile, the existing literature on the prison industry 
oversimplifies the picture in four key ways. First, many accounts 
approach changes in incarceration rates as though they were signs of a 
uniform trend,109 ignoring key differences among state prison systems 
 
 103.  See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 24, at 510 (describing the incentives for prosecutors and 
legislators to form an alliance). 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 75 (2007). 
 106.  Id. at 35–36; see also Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 
18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 532 (1970) (discussing the uncontrolled discretion of prosecutors); Tracey 
L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with 
Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 862 (1995) (discussing the prosecutor’s decision to 
charge). 
 107.  Stuntz, supra note 24, at 599. 
 108.  See supra Section I.B. 
 109.  By contrast, some advocacy groups, most notably the Prison Policy Initiative, have 
synthesized information on incarceration rates and have highlighted the significantly different 
trajectories of various states and the federal government. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 101. 
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and between state and federal prisons.110 Second, when scholars discuss 
“incentives” in the prison industry, the discussion tends to focus 
disproportionately on the private sector, minimizing the role of public-
sector stakeholders.111 This approach, which highlights tensions 
between the duties of private prison executives to their shareholders 
and to the state,112 also fails to account for significant distinctions 
among private-sector prisons. In this way, it allows the incentives of 
two large corporations, which are structured as real estate investment 
trusts, to overshadow those of small, regional companies.113 This myopic 
focus has obscured the range of potential private-sector involvement in 
prisons beyond large corporate ownership and management.114 
Third, even accounts that discuss prison industry resistance 
focus largely on the industry’s efforts to defeat reforms at the legislative 
or policy level,115 while ignoring stakeholders’ ability to frustrate 
 
 110.  For a breakdown of changes in the federal prison population as well as state-by-state 
graphs, see id. 
 111.  See, e.g., DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 
254–55 (1995) (debating the value of private prisons); Dolovich, supra note 18, at 441–42 (rejecting 
comparative efficiency as a method for evaluating the privatization of prisons); Joseph E. Field, 
Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of a Governmental Power , 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
649, 650 (1987) (analyzing the constitutionality of prison privatization); Ira Robbins, Privatization 
of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40 VAND. L. REV. 813, 815 (1987) (presenting both sides of the 
debate surrounding prison privatization); Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the 
Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149, 151 (2010) (arguing that prison privatization 
undermines the institution of criminal justice); Ahmed White, Rule of Law and the Limits of 
Sovereignty: The Private Prison in Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 112 
(2001) (providing a jurisprudential critique of privatization). 
 112.  Many scholars and advocates have criticized private management and operations of 
prisons as an affront to human dignity and as an improper delegation of state responsibility. See, 
e.g., Field, supra note 111, at 662 (arguing that the profit maximization goals of private prisons 
stand in contrast to social welfare goals); Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: 
Two Yet-to-Be-Met Challenges for Law and Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 749, 777 (2011) 
(categorizing prisons as an inherently governmental function); Sigler, supra note 111, at 156 
(indicating that democratic accountability and political legitimacy might be problematic for private 
prisons). For an international example, see Barak Medina, Constitutional Limits to Privatization: 
The Israeli Supreme Court Decision to Invalidate Prison Privatization, 8 INT. J. CONST. L. 690, 690 
(2010) (analyzing the Israeli Supreme Court’s recent decision invalidating legislation that would 
have established a privately run prison). 
 113.  See, e.g., Patrice A. Fulcher, Hustle and Flow: Prison Privatization Fueling the Prison 
Industrial Complex, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 589, 607 (2012) (detailing large campaign contributions by 
the two biggest private prisons companies). 
 114.  The range of services provided by private companies in the prison context is vast, and 
prisons that are managed and operated by the public sector are likely to contract with the private 
sector for such services as transportation, food, or medical care. See supra note 67. 
 115.  See, e.g., CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS, 211–20 (1990) 
(discussing the potential for corruption within private prisons); MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY 
AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 94–103 (1993) (discussing the 
relationship between prison privatization and public policy); Alexander Volokh, Privatization and 
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implementation through more subtle means.116 Fourth, existing 
accounts ignore the ways in which the industry (or constituent groups 
within it) might be inclined to adapt to a new decarceration-era 
landscape, and they may also overlook institutional design reforms that 
could motivate cooperation by prison industry stakeholders with 
decarceration-era goals. 
Relying on a theoretical model, Alexander Volokh takes 
preliminary steps to disentangle incentives in the public and private 
prison sectors, describing privatization as “a form of antitrust” that 
should make the public sector less powerful.117 He correctly observes 
that, like their private counterparts, “actors in the public sector already 
lobby for changes in substantive law.”118 But Volokh’s analysis 
overlooks significant distinctions between public-sector unions,119 as 
well as the range of approaches to prison privatization. These 
distinctions are crucial both for understanding the incentives of actors 
in their respective sectors and for assessing proposals to better align 
these incentives with decarceration-era goals. 
The following fine-grained analysis delves into these 
comparatively neglected distinctions within public and private sectors 
and also reveals unexpected parallels between these groups.120 This 
close examination of the incentives of prison industry actors is a 
prerequisite to understanding and combating prison industry 
resistance to decarceration-era reforms and to envisioning ways in 
which stakeholder incentives might be better aligned with the goals of 
prison reformers. 
 
the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1221 (2008) (debating 
whether prison privatization will increase pro-incarceration advocacy). 
 116.  See infra Section III.B. For example, Volokh’s model accounts for lobbying by the public 
and private sectors but does not address the other means of resistance that are relevant to the 
success or failure of decarceration efforts. Volokh, supra note 115. 
 117.  Volokh, supra note 115, at 1253. 
 118.  Id. at 1197 (asserting that “the ‘extra voice’ of the private sector will not necessarily 
increase either the amount of industry-increasing advocacy or its effectiveness,” even suggesting 
that “privatization may well reduce the industry’s political power”). 
 119.  Id. at 1204 (“[T]he largest actor—the actor that profits the most from the system—tends 
to be the public sector union, because the public sector provides the lion’s share of prison services 
. . . . The smaller actor is the private prison industry.”). But see infra Section III.C. While this is 
true in the aggregate, it ignores intrastate differences. Some state politicians have close ties with 
private prison leaders, whereas in other states, unions are so powerful that privatization is a losing 
battle. This analysis also ignores the very real possibility of public-private collusion. Infra Section 
III.C. 
 120.  Importantly, even where there are notable areas of overlap between public and private 
sectors, the levers for reform may at times be different. For example, while direct contracting with 
private actors may provide opportunities for reform, similar reforms in the public sector may be 
subject to administrative or procedural requirements.  
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II. THE PRISON INDUSTRY: KEY PLAYERS AND THEIR INCENTIVES 
This Part introduces two of the key players in the prison 
industry—correctional officers (as represented by their unions) and 
private prison management121—and highlights their shared preference 
for prison industry expansion.122 These players represent the loci of 
resistance to decarceration-era reforms in their respective sectors. In 
the private sector, resistance is most likely to come from management, 
whose profits are at stake; private-sector officers may also have reasons 
to favor prison expansion, but, because they are not unionized, they are 
a less powerful political force. Conversely, in the public sector, top-level 
executives are political appointees who often favor reforms; in such 
cases, the likely source of resistance is labor. The following analysis lays 
the groundwork for better understanding how and why prison industry 
stakeholders are likely to resist decarceration-era reforms. 
A. Correctional Officers and Their Unions 
Correctional officers rely on the continued strength of the prison 
industry for their job security. Officers in many states are members of 
unions that are sometimes part of a larger public employees union. 
Because these unions act on behalf of officers, and officers generally 
assert their interests through these unions, this Article discusses the 
incentives of officers as reflected through the prism of their unions.123 
 
 121.  While these are not the only groups that are invested in the existence and continued 
growth of the prison industry, they are important and underexplored contingents whose financial 
wellbeing is directly related to prisons. They thus serve as a useful starting point. By contrast, 
while sheriffs and prosecutors are key on-the-ground implementers of policy, their motivations are 
more in sync with the traditional literature on the political economy of the “tough on crime” era, 
as described by Stuntz, supra note 24, and others. Furthermore, as elected officials, their 
motivations are more diverse, and their financial interests (in many states) may not be directly 
correlated with an increase in the prison population. Sheriffs and prosecutors, while crucial 
players, are therefore beyond the scope of this Article. 
 122.  While a focus on these two groups may at first blush appear asymmetrical—i.e. some 
may wonder why the Article does not isolate officers in the public and private sectors or 
management in the public and private sectors—I argue that these two groups, representing the 
strongest interests in their respective sectors, shed light on important synergies and distinctions 
between public and private prison sectors. Comparisons between, for example, public and private 
officers—which do exist in the literature, focusing on such issues as compensation and turnover—
are limited because, while their day-to-day jobs may be similar, their influence on prison policy 
and reforms are profoundly different.  
 123.  Some public sector officers are not unionized in right to work states, and in a few 
Southern states (e.g., Louisiana and Alabama), there are no unions to represent officers. Fontenot 
interview, supra note 28. Since officers working in the private sector are not part of a union and 
therefore have no collective bargaining power, this section focuses on officers in the public sector. 
However, while private prison officers are not unionized, their interest in job security is not 
significantly different from those of public officers. Other than the issue of privatization, the 
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Unions representing correctional officers historically have 
preferred more punitive criminal laws and longer sentences.124 They 
may justify these preferences as necessary to punish “the bad guys.”125 
The preference for more punitive criminal laws also relies on a few basic 
assumptions. First, when the number of prisoners increases (and/or the 
length of prisoners’ sentences is extended), more prisons will be built. 
Second, an increase in the number of prisons will result in more jobs for 
correctional officers.126 Even if new prisons are not built, an increase in 
prisoners would require prisons to house more prisoners, which might 
still require hiring more officers, resulting in a net gain of officer jobs. 
Ultimately, prison expansion likely means job security (and perhaps 
promotion opportunities) for officers, whereas prison contraction likely 
means that officers will be laid off.127 Because the union’s job is to 
advance the interests of its members, and because job security is of 
paramount importance to correctional officers, the union is invested in 
expanding the reach of criminal law and the length of prison 
sentences.128 
Unions historically have also opposed the privatization of 
prisons,129 and they have lobbied against political candidates that favor 
 
positions taken by unions representing officers may be a reasonable proxy for both public and 
private officer interests. One practical difference between the two sectors is that, while the 
turnover rate in the public sector is high, the turnover rate of private officers is higher still, and 
private-sector officers generally receive less training and pay.  
 124.  See, PAGE, supra note 10 (describing the leanings of correctional officer unions). 
 125.  See, e.g., Cantrell interview, supra note 28. 
 126.  Tim Kowal, The Role of the Prison Guards Union in California’s Troubled Prison System 
(2011), http://ordinary-gentlemen.com/blog/2011/06/05/the-role-of-the-prison-guards-union-in-
californias-troubled-prison-system [http://perma.cc/5AQW-EFEG]; see also, Joan Petersilia, 
California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, 37 CRIME & JUST. 207, 224–25, 
(2008). 
 127.  See, e.g., Schrantz interview, supra note 28; see also Ram Subramanian & Alison Shames, 
Sentencing and Prison Practices in Germany and the Netherlands, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 33, 35–39 
(2013).  
 128.  Perverse incarceration incentives are not limited to correctional officers’ unions. For 
instance, in Michigan, until recently, the powerful psychologists’ union fought to keep prisoners 
ineligible for parole unless the prisoners participated in a six-month anger management program 
that employed union members. Schrantz interview, supra note 28. The anger-management 
program requirement applied to all inmates convicted of a violent offense, yet there were not 
sufficient program options for all of the relevant inmates to complete the required programs. Thus, 
the interests of the prisoners were held hostage in the battle between the psychologists’ union and 
prison administrators. 
 129.  See, e.g., Jack Spencer, Union Lobbying Helps Keep Prison Privatization Bill Locked Up, 
MICH. CAPITOL CONFIDENTIAL (May 4, 2012), http://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/ 16860 
[http://perma.cc/WKT6-RPSB]; Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Union for Federal Prison 
Officers Strongly Opposes Privatization Initiative in Elkton, Ohio (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/union-for-federal-prison-officers-strongly-opposes-
privatization-initiative-in-elkton-ohio-223508811.html [http:// perma.cc/54XZ-SRJH]; AFSCME 
Helps Close Dangerous Private Prisons, 16 NEWS FROM AFSCME CORRS. UNITED 1 (Fall 2013), 
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privatizing prisons.130 One union representative described privatization 
as “our biggest challenge” alongside “the challenge of getting a pay 
raise.”131 Private prisons hire outside the union and pay lower wages,132 
so every contract that goes to the private sector is a lost opportunity for 
more public-sector union jobs. 
Furthermore, if the private sector is successful in saving money 
while offering comparable services, then questions inevitably will arise 
about the viability of public-sector officer jobs and about whether their 
self-image as uniquely capable of dealing with a difficult population is 
justified. Officers pride themselves on being “tough.” They describe 
controlling prisons as “the toughest beat,”133 as “walk[ing] the toughest 
blocks,”134 and as “patrolling the toughest precincts.”135 The notion that 
officer jobs are especially demanding, and that officers are uniquely 
qualified to work in such a challenging environment, figures 
prominently in their collective self-image as depicted on union 
websites.136 
Related to the “toughness” trope that permeates officers’ self-
image is the pervasive “us versus them” rhetoric used to separate 
themselves from the inmates under their watch.137 According to 
correctional officer representatives, officers frequently refer to inmates 
as “bad guys”138 or “thugs”139 and are quick to reject proposed reforms 
aimed at improving inmate conditions.140 One corrections expert 




 130.  For example, when California state assembly incumbent Phil Wyman advocated for 
private prisons in 2002 as part of his re-election campaign, CCPOA contributed $200,000 to his 
opponent’s campaign, and Wyman lost the election. PAGE, supra note 10. 
 131.  Blackmer interview, supra note 28. 
 132.  Volokh, supra note 18, at 142. 
 133.  See, e.g., About Us, CAL. CORRECTIONAL PEACE OFFICERS ASS’N, http://www.ccpoa.org/ 
about-us/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2015) [http://perma.cc/VSC4-7FWN]   (describing the work 
correctional officers do as “the toughest beat”); see also R.I. BROTHERHOOD OF CORRECTIONAL 
OFFICERS, http://www.ri-brotherhood.com/ (last visited Oct.. 17, 2015) [http://perma.cc/3QJU-
VZ3P] (same). 
 134.  Miscellaneous Information, AFSCME LOCAL 543 (Allentown, PA), 
http://www.afscme543.com/info.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2014) [http://perma.cc/NYC2-MHQ9].  
 135.  See, e.g., CORRECTION OFFICERS’ BENEVOLENT ASS’N, INC., http://www.cobanyc.org/ (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2015) [http://perma.cc/T5UT-KFU8]. 
 136.  See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.  
 137.  Cohen interview, supra note 28 (describing the interpersonal dynamic in prisons as 
“designed to be us versus them”); see also Lowry interview, supra note 28; Suval interview, supra 
note 28.  
 138.  Cantrell interview, supra note 28. 
 139.  Lowry interview, supra note 28. 
 140.  Id. 
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“disturbs” correctional officers, many of whom believe that prison 
should be “a state of deprivation” where there is “no pleasure.”141 
Officers often come from the same neighborhoods as inmates,142 
so separating themselves using the rhetoric of “us versus them” may fill 
a psychological need.143 Indeed, officers and inmates are often linked 
“by common interests, cultural and social values and experiences and 
by common deprivations.”144 The narrow gap between officers and 
prisoners could motivate officers to distance themselves from the 
prisoners under their watch, occasionally asserting their superiority 
even to the point of abuse.145 
B. Private Prison Management 
Private prison management tends to prefer more punitive 
criminal laws and longer sentences because the more prisoners who 
need beds (and the more cash-strapped the states), the more likely 
private prisons will be relied upon. Because private prisons are paid per 
prisoner, per day, private prison companies will want to ensure that, 
once constructed, a prison will be filled to capacity, or at least that the 
prison will be subsidized if the prison population decreases, because 
otherwise the company will lose money. Thus, to avoid risk, private 
prison companies contract for a guaranteed occupancy rate over a 
period of many years, while preserving room to negotiate in order to 
increase the rates over time. In other words, states promise that 
regardless of underlying crime rates, they will incarcerate a specified 
number of their citizens in these prisons. At present, many private 
prison contracts provide for a guaranteed occupancy rate of 95% or 
higher for a period of twenty years.146 
 
 141.  Lewen interview, supra note 28. 
 142.  See e.g., Suvall interview, supra note 28; Jeffrey Toobin, This Is My Jail, THE NEW 
YORKER (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/14/this-is-my-jail 
[http://perma.cc/XDR3-PPPM]. 
 143.  See Toobin, supra note 142 (highlighting situations in which inmates have power over 
officers, specifically where male inmates manage to seduce female officers, gaining power over 
them).  
 144.  Alison Liebling, Prison Officers, Policing and the Use of Discretion, 4 THEORETICAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 333, 338 (2000). 
 145.  PAGE, supra note 10, at 202. Alternatively, this narrow gap between officers and inmates 
may make officers more prone to bribery, influence by inmates, and even romantic affairs. See 
Toobin, supra note 142; see also Bernie Tafoya, Corrections Officer, Two Others Charged in 
Smuggling Operation at Cook County Jail, CBS CHICAGO (June 30, 2014), 
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/06/30/corrections-officer-two-others-charged-in-smuggling-
operation-at-cook-county-jail/ [http://perma.cc/ECH5-49KQ]. 
 146.  See, e.g., In the Public Interest, Criminal: How Lockup Quotas and “Low-Crime Taxes” 
Guarantee Profits for Prison Corporations, 1, 15–16 (Sept. 19 2013) 
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However, while these contract terms ensure that the private 
company will be subsidized if the prison population decreases, a subsidy 
is not a long-term solution because, if prisons begin to empty out, their 
contracts risk not being renewed.147 Consequently, beyond achieving a 
particular set of generous contract terms, private companies prefer an 
expanding prison population because more contracts for more prisons 
is in their financial interest. 
Private prisons may even build prisons speculatively and 
without any government contract under the philosophy that, “if you 
build it, they will come.” In California, this strategy has already proven 
successful. Following the recent court order to reduce California prison 
overcrowding, the California governor has developed a plan to use a 
prison that was built “on spec” by a private company.148 
If the dominant self-image among correctional officers in the 
public sector is “toughness” and the notion that they are uniquely 
qualified for the most challenging jobs, that of the private sector is cost-
savings and the idea that they are uniquely equipped to offer services 
at a lower cost than the public sector. For example, one private prison 
shareholder statement boasted, “Our competitive cost structure offers 
prospective customers a compelling option for incarceration.”149 It noted 
further, “The unique budgetary challenges states are facing may cause 
states to further rely on us to help reduce costs, and also cause those 
states that have not previously utilized the private sector to turn to the 
private sector to help reduce their overall costs of incarceration. We are 
pursuing these opportunities.”150 
Private prison executives have strong incentives to offer a 
cheaper alternative to public-sector prisons151 and to offer data that 
 
http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/criminal-how-lockup-quotas-and-low-crime-taxes-guarantee-
profits-for-private-prison-corporations/ [http://perma.cc/3HQY-VG9J] (using Arizona, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, and Virginia as examples of states locked in contracts with quotas requiring between 
95% and 100% occupancy).  
 147.  Critics have also noted that some CCA and GEO Group facilities receive subsidies from 
local, state, or federal government sources as part of “an economic development strategy.” See 
Philip Mattera et al., Jail Breaks: Economic Development Subsidies Given to Private Prisons, INST. 
ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y, (2001), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/ 
jailbreaks.pdf [http://perma.cc/GH5A-TH5G] (finding that forty-three of sixty private prisons 
studied were subsidized by government sources). 
 148.  Fathi interview, supra note 28. 
 149.  Corrs. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312513080296/d452767d10k.htm [http://perma.cc/PVG3-
NX4Y].  
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Private prison executives also have incentives to structure their companies in whatever 
way will prove most financially viable, in some instances, preferring a REIT structure for its tax 
benefits. Both CCA and the GEO Group recently converted from a regular corporate structure to 
a REIT structure as a way to increase shareholder value and to reduce their federal tax liability 
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documents their claims of cost savings.152 When states are fiscally 
constrained, the private sector’s claims of cost savings along with 
comparable services are attractive. Private prisons get paid a certain 
amount—as per their contract—and they then have strong incentives 
to operate the prison for even less than that amount because the 
difference (i.e. any further costs they are able to save) is their profit.153 
The primary economic incentives for private prison executives are thus 
to limit costs and increase revenues.154 When the prison privatization 
movement began in the 1980s, supporters heralded the private sector 
as capable of demonstrating efficiency that public bureaucracies 
lacked.155 
The bulk of a prison’s costs, once constructed, is labor-related. 
Private prisons generally hire non-union officers, allowing them to pay 
lower wages.156 Private prisons may also reduce the number of 
correctional officers so as to reduce costs. According to Russell Boraas, 
a private prison administrator in Virginia, “The secret to low-cost 
operations is having the minimum number of officers watching the 
 
to zero, thus increasing their liquidity. Since maintaining a REIT structure requires that 80% of 
the corporation’s assets be in real estate, critics have suggested that the prospect of decarceration 
is directly antithetical to the interests of the private sector as the two largest prison companies 
rely on warehousing for their bottom line. Friedmann interview, supra note 20 (questioning, “if 
you begin with the assumption that we imprison too many people, does it make sense to have a 
model where the bottom line is premised on maintaining and growing the prison population?”). It 
is worth considering the special concerns raised by how a private corporation is structured and 
whether it is publicly traded, since a company’s duty to shareholders may run in tension with 
social welfare goals.  
 152.  See, e.g., Press Release, The Geo Grp., Inc., Study by Temple University Professors Finds 
Private Operated Prisons Can Substantially Cut Costs at Equal or Better Levels of Quality (2013), 
http://www.geogroup.com/temple_university_study_findings [http://perma.cc/ R5DP-FXVY] 
(highlighting, on the GEO Group website, a 2013 study by Temple University economics professors 
Simon Hakim and Erwin Blackstone). But see Susan Snyder, Temple Probing Funding of Two 
Professors’ Research, THE PHILA. INQUIRER (June 10, 2014), http://articles.philly.com/2014-06-
10/news/50451738_1_research-funding-professors-funding-source [http://perma.cc/3XPG-BJBY] 
(“Temple University is investigating an ethics complaint that two of its professors did not properly 
disclose funding from the private prison industry for their research on the cost of incarceration.”). 
 153.  Bates, supra note 6; see also Michael Montgomery, Performance Measures and Private 
Prisons, in 3 PRISON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 3, at 203 (“Since a company’s profit margin is 
considered proprietary information, private prison companies may not be required to disclose the 
actual cost of their operations.”).  
 154.  While increasing revenue and decreasing costs is of paramount importance to executives 
across the private prison industry, unlike the two publicly traded private corporations—CCA and 
the GEO Group—other private prison firms have more flexibility in their business approaches 
since they are less likely to be challenged for business decisions that do not have a clear benefit 
for shareholders. 
 155.  Bates, supra note 6 (quoting Thomas Beasley, a CCA executive, who quipped, “the 
government can’t do anything very well”).  
 156.  CODY MASON, TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE: PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA 7 (Jan. 2012), 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Too_Good_to_be_True.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
LW72-K22J]. 
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maximum number of inmates.”157 As another way to reduce costs, all 
but the most indispensable—or contracted for—training and services 
may be eliminated, including staff training and inmate treatment 
programs.158 Additionally, so long as private prisons are paid a flat rate 
per day, per inmate, they will prefer to house inmates who require the 
least medical or other care. 
The two largest corporations, Correctional Corporation of 
America and the GEO Group,159 are structured as real estate 
investment trusts (REITs), requiring that 80% of their investment be 
in real estate. Unlike most publicly traded corporations, companies 
structured as REITs are not required to pay corporate income tax. This 
choice of corporate structure also requires companies to minimize 
investments not related to the physical buildings they operate, which 
may result in decisions to cut costs on supervision, treatment, and 
medical care, among other inmate services. Another way publicly 
traded private prisons save money is by substituting pensions earned 
by correctional officers in state prisons with stock ownership plans. 
Employees are thus invested in the company’s bottom line. According 
to one officer, “Being a stockholder yourself, you monitor things 
closer. . . . You make sure you don’t waste money on things like cleaning 
products. Because it’s your money you’re spending.”160 
The leadership at some of the smaller private prison companies 
has tried to distinguish their companies from “the duopoly” of CCA and 
the GEO Group.161 They stress that many in their ranks hail from the 
education sector, and they take pride in their educational offerings.162 
For example, LeeAnn Prince, the Director of Corrections Programs at 
Management & Training Corporation (MTC), described MTC ’s 
“emphasis on education.” However, even if a private prison’s mission is 
to promote “rehabilitation through education,” as is MTC’s motto, the 
ability of the private sector to innovate and offer programming is 
directly dependent on the state’s willingness to contract for expanded 
services. While Prince noted that her company prides itself on its 
 
 157.  Bates, supra note 6.  
 158.  Christopher Hartney & Caroline Glesmann, Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations are 
Reshaping Criminal Justice in the U.S., NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY 12 (May 2012). 
 159.  See Nicole Goodkind, Top 5 Secrets of the Private Prison Industry, DAILY TICKER (Aug. 6, 
2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/top-5-secrets-private-prison-industry-
163005314.html [http://perma.cc/Y4VD-WK2F] (noting that these two corporations have been 
referred to as “a duopoly” because of their dominance in the private corrections industry). 
 160.  Bates, supra note 6 (describing CCA’s juxtaposition on a prominent bulletin board inside 
the front entrance of its headquarters of the words “C.C.A. Excellence in Corrections” at the top, 
and “Yesterday's Stock Closing,” followed by a price, at the bottom). 
 161.  See, e.g., Prince interview, supra note 28; Fretz interview, supra note 28.  
 162.  Fretz interview, supra note 28. 
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capacity for educational offerings, she was quick to add, “where 
contracts allow.”163 Ultimately, MTC, like all private prison providers, 
is bound by the provisions of state contracts and, “in this economy, it’s 
usually cost-based.”164 
The MTC leadership would like to see “the results of needs 
assessments,”165 but this would require that states pay for a placement 
test and share the results with the private prison custodians. Without 
either more flexibility to budget as they see fit or contract specifications 
that provide for tests and placement services, private prisons may not 
be in a position to innovate, or to use tools and resources that could 
make programs more efficacious and have positive effects on an 
inmate’s rehabilitation. Prince reported that the rehabilitative 
resources provided “depends on who the client is” and that, especially 
when Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or the Bureau of 
Prisons is the client, “there is not too much rehabilitation” involved.166 
Leaders at Community Education Centers (CEC), another 
smaller private prison company, also highlighted the tension between 
two priorities: (1) quality assurance, which is driven by a desire for 
effectiveness in their mission of reducing recidivism and (2) cost 
savings, which is crucial to obtaining state contracts.167 Ralph Fretz, 
Director of Assessment and Research at CEC, remarked that “we get 
thrown in with the other [private prison corporations]” and that 
fighting this categorization is “an uphill battle.”168 CEC attempts to 
distinguish itself as primarily a “correctional treatment organization,” 
as opposed to being in “the business of private prisons,”169 yet it 
competes with other private companies on the basis of which firm can 
save the state the most money. Ultimately, cost savings reign supreme. 
Yet the desire for cost savings, while dominant for private companies, 
is not absolute. Private firms also want to maintain order and avoid 
scandalous, publicized incidents, which would harm their reputation 
and jeopardize their ability to obtain future contracts.170 
 
 163.  Prince interview, supra note 28. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Fretz interview, supra note 28. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. (remarking that “we don’t think of ourselves as private prisons,” and stressing that, 
“in the end, if people are showing improvement, and they are treated humanely, that is our job”). 
 170.  That said, so long as the prison sector as a whole has a steady stream of critics, private 
prisons may be less concerned about individual allegations. Moreover, while a scandal in one 
private prison may reflect poorly on all private prisons (as it may be framed as endemic to the 
private-sector control of the state function of punishment), it may also render other private prison 
companies virtually immune since none would stand out as uniquely poor. And so long as public 
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Both public and private prison industry stakeholders have 
demonstrated preferences for an expansion of the prison industry, and 
both sectors expend significant resources to support its further growth. 
The next Part examines responses by industry stakeholders to a new 
landscape, in which decarceration-era goals are gaining prominence 
and threaten the further expansion of the prison industry.171 
III. RESISTANCE TO DECARCERATION 
Recent policies—such as those that provide more opportunities 
for early release and diversionary options—have been lauded for 
attempting to reduce the prison population, ushering in a new era of 
decarceration.172 However, while crime rates have been decreasing and 
recent polls show that people are less concerned about crime than about 
the economy,173 there remain strong loci of resistance to decarceration-
era goals. This Part focuses on how prison industry stakeholders have 
responded to changes afoot that are designed to reduce the prison 
population, promote rehabilitation of inmates, and improve conditions 
in prisons. 
Several corrections leaders emphasized that, even apart from 
self-interested resistance to specific policy reforms, a general resistance 
to change may be endemic in the prison industry.174 In the words of one 
union representative whose prior experience included work in law 
enforcement, “I’ve never seen an occupation that resists change more 
than corrections.”175 
 
prisons fail to demonstrate that their conditions are “minimal[ly] adequate,” see, e.g., Brown v. 
Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1924 (2011), the hurdle for (and expectations of) private prisons likely will 
remain similarly low.  
 171.  While this trend can be seen in a number of states, it is by no means the case that every 
state is seriously considering wide-scale prison reform efforts. In Arizona, for example, the prisons 
are over capacity and more prisons are being constructed. Blackmer interview, supra note 28 
(noting the seriousness of the overcrowding problem in Arizona prisons and also the lack of vocal 
opposition to further prison construction in the state).  
 172.  See supra, notes 79–80. 
 173.  Economy, Jobs Trump All Other Policy Priorities, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2009), 
http://www.people-press.org/2009/01/22/economy-jobs-trump-all-other-policy-priorities-in-2009/ 
[http://perma.cc/MGU3-CB7N] (finding that, in 2009, the nation’s highest policy priority was the 
economy, while crime was rated as twelfth in importance). 
 174.  See, e.g., Lowry interview, supra note 28. 
 175.  Id. One factor that may contribute to institutional actors’ resistance to reform is a belief 
that the status quo represents the “appropriate ordering of society.” TREBILCOCK, supra note 14, 
at 47. In the prison industry context, the similar backgrounds of many officers and inmates, which 
contributes to the “us versus them” mentality, may also make the status quo “ordering” essential 
to the officers’ identity, thus making them particularly resistant to change. The larger question of 
what industries are more and less resistant to reform, and why, is an area ripe for future research. 
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A. Political Activism as Resistance 
Even as the U.S. system of mass incarceration is increasingly 
under fire, prison industry stakeholders remain politically vocal, 
resisting efforts to close prisons, reform sentences, and increase 
opportunities for early release. Stakeholders in both sectors have also 
continued to expand their influence by finding overlap between the 
interests of businesses, community groups, legislators, other 
government workers, and their own financial interests.176 
For example, the correctional officers’ union in Illinois was 
particularly vocal in opposing Governor Quinn’s order to close Tamms 
Supermax.177 This maximum-security prison in Southern Illinois was 
notorious for its brutal treatment of prisoners with mental illness,178 
which included isolating them for years, often indefinitely, in solitary 
confinement.179 The American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) union worked to stall the closure 
order through the courts, taking the position that conditions at Tamms 
were necessary to maintain prison safety and security as well as to keep 
jobs in Southern Illinois.180 The union, which was described as “the 
 
 176.  These efforts, however, are not always successful. For example, in the case of New York’s 
McGregor prison, despite forging an alliance with Senator Kathleen Marchione, who explained 
that the proposed prison closure “would cost our community 320 public safety positions and hurt 
the local economy,” the union lost its battle. Kelly Fay, Prison Closures Going Forward As Planned, 




 177.  See, e.g., Hundreds Oppose Tamms Closure at Packed COGFA Hearing, AFSCME 
Council 31 (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.afscme31.org/news/hundreds-oppose-tamms-closure-at-
packed-cogfa-hearing [http://perma.cc/7XQB-C2NB]. Tamms was opened in 1998 with the express 
purpose of providing disruptive inmates with shock treatment to make them more compliant. 
Laurie Lo Reynolds & Stephen F. Eisenman, Tamms is Torture: The Campaign to Close an Illinois 
Supermax Prison, CREATIVE TIME REPORTS (May. 6, 2013), 
http://creativetimereports.org/2013/05/06/tamms-is-torture-campaign-close-illinois-supermax-
prison-solitary-confinement/ [http://perma.cc/EGM4-93AM] (noting that, while Tamms was 
designed to house inmates for a year, many prisoners were left there indefinitely, and describing 
the “sensory deprivation” at Tamms, which was built “without a yard, cafeteria, classrooms or 
chapel,” and allowed “[n]o phone calls, communal activities or contact visits”). 
 178.  See Reynolds & Eisenman, supra note 177. 
 179.  James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, Solidarity and Solitary: When Unions Clash with 
Prison Reform, SOLITARY WATCH (Feb. 21, 2013), http://solitarywatch.com/2013/02/21/solidarity-
and-solitary-when-unions-clash-with-prison-reform/ [http://perma.cc/R9BN-RSVD] 
 180.  Id. This stance was directly in opposition to the position of prison reformers. See, e.g., 
Laurie Jo Reynolds & Stephen Eisenman, Is This America’s Worst Prison? The Inspirational 
Campaign to Close Tamms Supermax, ALTERNET (May 9, 2013), http://www.alternet.org/ 
activism/americas-worst-prison-inspirational-campaign-close-tamms-supermax [http://perma.cc/ 
5AKZ-344G] (describing the conditions at Tamms as “cruel, inhuman, and degrading”).  
        
2016] INCARCERATION INCENTIVES 103 
major force that had opposed the closure,”181 was also instrumental in 
mounting a public campaign to keep the prison open. Ironically, despite 
its pro-prison stance, AFSCME has bragged about closing private 
prisons; an AFSCME Bulletin from Fall 2013 boasted, “AFSCME Helps 
Close Dangerous Private Prisons,” referring to the closing of Dawson 
State Jail in Texas, which was managed by the Correctional 
Corporation of America.182 
Public unions spend political capital (and, in some cases, 
millions of dollars) to advocate in favor of policies that would support 
the continued growth of the prison industry; they lobby in favor of 
eliminating parole for violent felons183 and against proposals to 
overhaul mandatory minimum sentences.184 For example, the 
California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA), which is 
widely regarded as the most powerful such union due both to its size 
and independence,185 employs twenty full-time individuals to handle its 
public relations and legal matters and spends roughly $8 million per 
year on lobbying.186 California is not the only state where officers, 
through their union representation, lobby extensively and possess 
significant political clout.187 Unions representing officers in many states 
 
 181.  AFSCME, the union that was at the forefront of this political battle, which represents 
62,000 officers and 23,000 employees nationally, has not taken a definitive position on solitary 
confinement. Ridgeway & Casella, supra note 179. 
 182.  AFSCME Helps Close Dangerous Private Prisons, supra note 129. 
 183.  Mike Riggs, Public Sector Prison Unions Are Spending Almost as Much on Campaigns 
as Private Prison Companies, REASON: HIT AND RUN BLOG (Aug. 22, 2012, 4:53 PM), 
https://reason.com/blog/2012/08/22/what-does-it-mean-that-public-sector-pri [http://perma.cc/ 
93ZM-9D6D]; Nathaniel Heggins Bryant, The Prison-Industrial Complex and Organized Labor: 
Union Complicity in the Corrections Industry, Presentation at Stony Brook University How Class 
Works – 2014 Conference 6 (2014), http://www.stonybrook.edu/workingclass/images/ 
2014conference_papers/bryant2.pdf [http://perma.cc/N3RG-EPRZ]..   
 184.  See Julie Falk, Fiscal Lockdown Part II: Will State Budget Cuts Weaken the Prison-
Industrial Complex—Or Strengthen It?, DOLLARS & SENSE, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 32  (discussing the 
potential outcomes of state budget cuts on prisons). 
 185.  Putting CCPOA’s dominance into context, a Texas union leader remarked, “In Texas, I 
have to play politics; in California, they own politics.” Lowry interview, supra note 28. Rhode 
Island’s correctional officers’ union is also independent and considered a very powerful force in the 
state, though given the small size of the state it does not have a comparable national presence. 
Wall interview, supra note 28. 
 186.  The Role of the Prison Guards Union in California’s Troubled Prison System, PRISON 
ACTIVIST RESOURCE CTR. (May 18, 2014), https://www.prisonactivist.org/alerts/role-prison-guards-
union-california%E2%80%99s-troubled-prison-system [https://perma.cc/5VCZ-EZAR]; About the 
CCPOA, PRISON TALK (Nov. 11, 2013, 11:12 PM), http://www.prisontalk.com/forums 
/archive/index.php/t-33069.html [http://perma.cc/YR62-USPE]. 
 187.  This Article thus highlights examples from both California and other states, noting 
differences between the unions where relevant. By contrast, much of the existing scholarship on 
correctional officers’ unions focuses almost exclusively on the California union. E.g., AMY LERMAN, 
THE MODERN PRISON PARADOX: POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND SOCIAL COMMUNITY (2013); PAGE, 
supra note 10. 
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have endorsed candidates188 and policies that support their “tough on 
crime” philosophy.189 
In jurisdictions where officers are part of a larger umbrella 
union, they are often a very influential contingent.190 Union leaders 
may feel pressure to placate correctional officers by advocating for 
measures that would advance their interests.191 For example, in 
Maryland, where correctional officers account for about one-quarter of 
the statewide membership of AFSCME, the union recently pushed 
through a Correctional Officers Bill of Rights (COBR), which added 
significant procedural protections for officers facing administrative 
discipline and made punishment “only a ‘very’ remote possibility.”192 
The Maryland legislature enacted COBR in an election year after 
correctional officers had been punished for “savagely beating” 
inmates.193 COBR was extremely controversial and widely criticized, 
with an FBI affidavit describing the COBR internal review process as 
“ineffective as a deterrent,” but union support was decisive.194 
Unions have gained further political clout by finding allies in 
community groups, businesses, and victims’ groups that also advocate 
for increased imprisonment. In “one-industry towns” where prison work 
is a dominant source of income for residents, the concentrated pressure 
of local voters and union leadership is politically powerful. A leader of 
the Florida Teamsters described the “outcry” that followed the Florida 
Department of Corrections decision to close the Jefferson Correctional 
Institution in Monticello.195 Community groups joined forces with the 
union to successfully oppose the proposed closure of Jefferson prison, 
 
 188.  Press Release, R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional 
Officers Endorses Whitehouse (Aug. 25, 2006) (on file with author). 
 189.  Leading examples include unions in Florida, New York, Rhode Island, and Michigan. 
See, e.g., Aaron Deslatte, Crist Courts Voters with Positive Focus, FLORIDA TODAY, Aug. 16, 2006, 
at A1; Falk, supra note 184, at 32; Bryant, supra note 183, at 6; Press Release, R.I. Bhd. of Corr. 
Officers, supra note 188. 
 190.  Of crucial significance is the percentage of union members that are correctional officers. 
Where this percent is small, the larger union forces that tend toward progressive policies may 
prevail, whereas when the percent is large, then the union may need to accommodate the 
correctional officers and their pro-incarceration preferences. 
 191.  Charles Lane, Baltimore Behind Bars: Public-Union Power Enabled Scandalous 
Corruption Among the City’s Correctional Officers, CITY JOURNAL (Spring 2014),  http://www.city-
journal.org/2014/24_2_baltimore-correctional-services-corruption.html [http://perma.cc/VQX7-
A572]. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  COBR included a provision that allowed prison administrators to impose “emergency 
suspensions [of correctional officers] in the best interest of the inmates, the public, and the 
correctional facility” but required that such suspensions come with pay. Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 195.  Cantrell interview, supra note 28. 
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which was the “largest employer in the county.”196 Jefferson County’s 
board ultimately passed a resolution documenting “[t]he loss of jobs and 
the impact on the local economy and community . . . estimated to have 
a $19 million impact on local economic activity and uprooting longtime 
residents who must move elsewhere to find new jobs.”197 A Florida 
correctional officer elaborated further, “Closing Jefferson [would] cost 
me my job. I have ties to this community and I can’t afford to move 
somewhere else in Florida.”198 Patricia Caruso, former Director of the 
Michigan Department of Corrections explained the phenomenon of one-
industry prison towns: “In the 1980s, we created this problem. 
Communities either wanted jobs, or they didn’t have the political 
influence to keep prisons away from their towns. [Now their] livelihood 
depends on people being incarcerated.”199 
Correctional officers’ unions have also allied themselves with 
businesses that risk losing cheap labor if prisons are closed. Businesses 
in many states profit from cheap inmate labor; for example, in 
Washington, inmates fight fires and clean up litter and graffiti for fifty 
cents an hour (at a maximum of $55 per month).200 One local employer 
explained, “They are a tremendous asset. When you have guys . . . eager 
to do work that others might not want to do . . . it’s really an 
advantage.”201 The Florida union worked with community businesses 
and the county council to avoid the closure of a local prison.202 One 
business leader explained that inmates “do everything from staking, 
picking and weeding to landscaping and carpentry work. And we pay 
them $2 per hour as opposed to around $9, which we ’d have to pay for 
outside laborers.”203 In New York, the union found an ally in the 
Highway Superintendent who also opposed prison closures, asserting 
 
 196.  Id.; see also Correctional Officers Applaud Jefferson County Resolution Against Prison 
Closure, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/correctional-
officers-applaud-jefferson-county-resolution-against-prison-closure-137731038.html 
[http://perma.cc/4P3M-6XVW]. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Caruso interview, supra note 28 (noting further that the increase in incarceration rate 
has led to an increase in one-industry towns where standard arguments against prison closure 
include not only public safety concerns but also loss of jobs and even concerns about the 
sustainability of the local school system, i.e. how many kids will be lost if the prison is closed).  
 200.  Joe English, Opposition Deepens to Larch Mountain Closure, KATU (Feb. 2, 2010), 
http://www.katu.com/news/local/83399582.html?mobile=y [http://perma.cc/V3WM-M5KL]. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Cantrell interview, supra note 28. 
 203.  Lois Kindle, Activists, Lawmakers Lobbying to Keep Prison Open, THE TAMPA TRIBUNE 
(Mar. 19, 2013), http://www2.tbo.com/south-shore/activists-lawmakers-lobbying-to-keep-prison-
open-350502 [http://perma.cc/Z4WN-Q9VJ]. 
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that the highways benefit from the cheap maintenance work provided 
by inmates.204 
In California, the officers’ union has allied itself with victims’ 
groups, going so far as to create and sponsor victims’ rights 
organizations,205 most notably the Crime Victims United of California 
(CVUC)—a strong advocate for longer sentences and reduced parole. 
The union provides 100% of CVUC’s political action committee money 
and both the union and the victims’ rights organization often employ 
the same lobbyists. The victims’ rights organization is understood to 
provide moral authority for pro-incarceration policies, which 
supplements the union’s financial resources. Explaining the success of 
this approach, Jeff Thompson, who has served as a lobbyist for both the 
union and the victims’ rights group, noted, “nobody feels empathetic for 
prison guards, but everyone’s got sympathy for crime victims.”206 
Furthermore, when politicians want to show that they are tough on 
crime, the victims’ rights organization is a convenient ally—which 
further augments the influence of the union.207 
In California, the correctional officers’ union, through CVUC, its 
victims’ rights organization, has opposed decarceration-era reforms, 
most notably attempts to reform California’s sentencing laws.208 Even 
in the “tough on crime” era, the moral authority provided by the union’s 
alliance with the victims’ rights organization was a public relations 
boon to the union.209 In more ambivalent times (and especially as fiscal 
 
 204.  Lucas Willard, Lawmakers, Union Hope to Prevent Closure of Saratoga County Prison, 
WAMC NE. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 26, 2013), http://wamc.org/post/lawmakers-union-hope-prevent-
closure-saratoga-county-prison [http://perma.cc/PE9H-RUVU]. 
 205.  CCPOA employees themselves acknowledge that it is “hard to argue that victims’ groups 
do not act as proxies since they even use the same lobbyists.” PAGE, supra note 10, at 103. 
 206.  Id. at 222. CVUC has effectively become the voice of victims in California. Thanks to 
CCPOA funding and support as so-called “puppet master,” the voice of CVUC “drowns out” the 
other victims’ groups, marginalizing voices that “promote reconciliation . . . and prefer treatment 
and rehabilitation over vengeful penal sanctions.” Id. at 82.  
 207.  Id. at 109. Meanwhile, the portrait drawn by CVUC fits the stereotype of the 
“prototypical crime victim”: white, middle-class family members of homicide victims, despite the 
fact that a mere .3% of crimes in California are homicides. Id. 
 208.  For example, the victims’ rights group lobbied against laws to allow early parole for 
critically ill prisoners, including those who are comatose, and against legislation that would allow 
some of those sentenced as juveniles to life without parole to have their terms reduced. Id. at 390. 
As part of his speech opposing the reform of California’s Three Strikes laws, Marc Klaas, who 
became a victim advocate after the highly publicized murder of his twelve-year old daughter, 
delivered an impassioned speech about the role of prison and prisoners:  “They don’t need GEDs; 
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woes in California escalate), the victims’ rights group is an invaluable 
ally because the union can funnel money through the victims ’ rights 
organization while avoiding criticism that it is acting irresponsibly and 
solely out of self-interest.210 Indeed, while CCPOA and CVUC both 
contributed extensively to campaigns in the 1990s and early 2000s, in 
more recent years, CCPOA direct contributions decreased somewhat, 
while the victims’ groups contributed more money to pro-incarceration 
campaigns.211 Recently, the fair political practices commission insisted 
that CVUC’s main political action committee change its name from 
CVUIEC (Crime Victims United Independent Expenditure Committee) 
to “CVUIEC Sponsored by the CCPOA.”212 
The private prison industry is also politically vocal, with three 
corporations spending more than $45 million in the last decade on pro-
incarceration lobbying.213 They have backed legislators who support an 
increase in prison privatization and harsher immigration policies. For 
example, thirty of the thirty-six legislators who co-sponsored an 
immigration law in Arizona, which would result in a significant 
increase in the number of detainees, received campaign contributions 
from private prison corporations.214 Private prison companies helped to 
draft and pass key immigration bills such as the Support Our Law 
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act immigration bill in 
Arizona215 and Georgia’s Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement 
Act of 2011.”216 Corporations that manage and operate federal detention 
centers have much to gain from these bills because they would result in 
an increase in the number of individuals placed in the federal custody 
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2010 to eleven state senators, seventeen state representatives, and the state governor, all of whom 
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of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.217 Private corporations have 
also lobbied to reclassify misdemeanors as felonies; for example, in 
Oklahoma, they lobbied to convert the crime of introducing a cell phone 
into prison, which traditionally was a misdemeanor, into a felony, 
raising the minimum sentence to two years and the maximum to seven 
years.218 
The public relations campaigns of the publicly traded prison 
corporations are most discernible through their shareholder 
statements. Recently, Corrections Corporation of America assured 
investors that demand for beds would continue,219 while GEO Group 
executives conveyed to investors that they could count on a “growing 
offender population.”220 One former private prison executive elaborated: 
“I don’t think we have to worry about running out of product. It’s 
unfortunate but true.”221 CCA’s recent shareholder statement specified, 
“We are pursuing a number of initiatives intended to increase our 
occupancy and revenue.”222 Some have highlighted the close 
relationships between private-sector leaders and state officials as a 
partial explanation for the success of private prison companies.223 For 
example, in Florida, Governor Rick Scott recently headlined a $10,000 
per person fundraiser at the home of George Zoley, CEO of the Boca 
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ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2012/08/31/ 
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(highlighting ties between Arizona Governor Jan Brewer and lobbyists for CCA); Bob Libal, 
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Raton-based GEO Group.224 Governor Scott has supported prison 
privatization and a plan to expand the GEO Group’s role in the state.225 
Private prison corporations have also found allies to join them 
in opposing the closure of prisons, even when extra bed space is 
unnecessary. Recently, Colorado paid millions of dollars to CCA to keep 
open a prison “in order to protect the economic base of small, rural 
communities that have become dependent on the jobs that for-profit 
prisons provide.”226 The private sector was able to capitalize on the need 
of local politicians to retain the support of voters in their communities 
and avoided prison closure by virtue of this political alliance. 
Private corporations continue to demand minimum occupancy 
contracts for up to twenty years, further thwarting decarceration-era 
goals, and they frequently use the legislative process to achieve these 
contract terms. Of sixty private prison contracts recently released as 
part of a public records request, nearly two-thirds of the contracts 
included an occupancy guarantee; most of these contracts included a 
provision mandating an occupancy rate of 90% or more.227 Justin Jones, 
a former Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, recalled 
an occasion when CCA, which had already secured a 94% minimum 
occupancy requirement, demanded that the occupancy requirement in 
its contract be increased to 98%.228 When this demand was refused, CCA 
went to the Oklahoma State Capitol and threatened to close the facility, 
which would have cost the local community 400 jobs.229 Despite Jones’s 
assurance that “they were bluffing,” and that CCA would not dare 
follow through on this threat as it would jeopardize their standing with 
shareholders, Oklahoma legislators refused to “call CCA’s bluff” and 
agreed to the private company’s demands.230 
Aside from actively resisting prison closures and demanding 
minimum-occupancy requirements, the private prison sector has 
turned its advocacy efforts toward ensuring that the growing federal 
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detention market continues to prosper. The market for immigration 
detention centers has been a boon to the private sector,231 and private 
companies are increasingly drawn to federal contracts.232 Federal 
contracts may be more stable than state contracts,233 and this 
preference has informed private-sector advocacy efforts.234 
The detention market may be particularly profitable (and thus 
desirable) to the private sector because detention is cheaper than 
imprisonment, in part because there is no requirement of providing 
educational or other programs.235 Thus, private detention centers may 
reap outsized profits. Furthermore, detention centers are more likely to 
house detainees who are younger and healthier for the short term, 
making them even more desirable to corporations concerned with 
generating revenue for shareholders.236 This is among the reasons why 
private prisons, seeing more consistent upward trajectory in the federal 
immigration context,237 have focused their political activism on 
ensuring that the immigration sector continues to grow,238 and on 
resisting immigration reforms that would disrupt the growth of the 
federal detainee population. 
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B. Discretionary Decisions as Resistance 
Corrections officers make countless discretionary disciplinary 
decisions per day, and there is scant oversight of these decisions.239 
When an inmate is disciplined by an officer, that inmate generally loses 
accrued “good time credit” toward early release. This is highly 
significant because an inmate’s sentence minus “good time” determines 
when the inmate is released from custody. Discretionary decisions by 
officers also affect where an inmate serves his or her sentence, which 
may also affect the inmate’s accrual of good time. Officers’ decisions 
may have the effect of sending inmates to administrative segregation, 
colloquially termed “ad seg.”240 As one corrections department director 
explained, “disciplinary infractions result in disciplinary confinement, 
which results in the loss of earned time.”241 Even where the prison’s 
warden is required to sign off on an officer’s disciplinary decision, this 
may involve mere “rubber-stamping.”242 In such cases, there is no 
meaningful oversight of officers’ disciplinary decisions. 
In the private prison context, “every day [of early release credit] 
a prisoner loses is a day of extra income for the company.”243 An inmate 
sent to administrative segregation loses thirty days of accumulated 
good time. In the case of the Corrections Corporation of America, a 
placement in administrative segregation would result in an added 
bonus to the company of nearly $1,000 in profit.244 One account suggests 
that in Tennessee, CCA correctional officers are encouraged to 
document minor infractions by prisoners and send them to 
administrative segregation.245 While comparisons between private and 
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public facilities are hindered by many variables,246 one state study in 
New Mexico found that inmates at a CCA facility lost good time at a 
rate nearly eight times higher than at a state-run facility.247 
Discretionary decisions that result in longer periods of incarceration 
may not necessarily be motivated by an affirmative desire to thwart 
decarceration-era goals, but when these decisions are motivated for 
reasons other than maintaining order, they may represent a broader 
resistance to the goals of rehabilitation and reentry. It is very difficult 
to assess whether inmates are being disciplined appropriately or not. 
Nevertheless, if an officer wanted to punish the inmate, there are 
obvious avenues the officer could pursue through disciplinary measures 
that would result in administrative segregation and/or increase the 
inmate’s time in prison.248 
Staff may use “ad seg” as “retaliation,” and some claim that 
officers “fabricate evidence,” though these allegations are rarely 
substantiated because individual discretionary decisions are difficult to 
challenge.249 Nonetheless, these discretionary decisions may have 
drastic ramifications. For example, in California, a “validated gang 
member” is subject to a six-year minimum sentence in the Solitary 
Housing Unit (known as “the SHU”).250 A validated gang member can 
be released from the SHU only if he “debriefs” or provides information 
about other associates.251 Simply put, “the only way to prove that you’re 
not in a gang is to rat out your friends.”252 And, while there are 
designated criteria to “validate” gang membership, many have 
suggested that this highly important decision with serious 
consequences is itself a discretionary, “pseudo-legal process” that 
involves neither a right to a hearing nor other due process 
considerations.253 Under the Security Threat Group classification 
system, the California Department of Corrections “must compile at 
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least 3 independent source items that add up to 10 points.”254 These 
source items could include contact information for a gang member, 
“distinctive clothing,” and the all-important “information supplied by 
confidential and non-confidential informants.”255 These determinations, 
while part of a designated classification system, are essentially 
discretionary decisions—because the criteria are so broad—and could 
significantly delay an inmate’s release. Thus, staff attuned to a prison’s 
financial incentives could overtly thwart reform efforts; others inclined 
to retaliate against a particular inmate, or to otherwise showcase their 
authority, could inadvertently subvert prison reform goals. 
C. Collusion as Resistance 
Collusion by public and private industry stakeholders could also 
undermine policy purposes. For example, while correctional officers’ 
unions and private prison corporations historically have been at odds, 
these groups are united by a common desire to grow the prison industry, 
and they may find common ground at the expense of decarceration-era 
goals. 
Historically, when states have floated the idea of privatizing 
part of the prison system in order to alleviate overcrowding in public 
sector prisons, correctional officers’ unions have vociferously opposed 
this idea,256 concerned about a threat to their jobs. However, if a 
privatization scheme sufficiently integrated public-sector employees, 
unions could be persuaded to join forces with private companies as a 
means of preserving their members’ job security. Such a scheme could 
thus invigorate political opposition to decarceration by merging the 
political clout of union workers and the corporate lobby. 
In California, Governor Brown recently proposed a plan that 
would increase the private prison presence in the state but staff private 
facilities with union officers.257 This arrangement would radically 
disrupt what has been a traditional alliance—that between the 
California officers’ union and prison reformers against privatization.258 
Yet state officials managed to avoid union outcry by suggesting that 
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union employees would staff the private prison. State officials also 
managed to avoid public outcry about spending more money for prison 
construction at a time when California was in a fiscally desperate 
situation;259 while the state would not be saving money in labor costs 
(because it would be paying union wages), at least it would not be 
expending funds on prison construction. This proposal invited public 
and private sectors to harness their shared incentives to resist 
decarceration-era goals.260 Importantly, while the interests of both 
factions were already aligned toward expanding the prison industry, for 
the first time, they also shared opportunities to benefit from 
privatization.261 
Prison reformers have described this unlikely public-private 
alliance as “a politically powerful model,” speculating, “there will be 
nothing temporary about this growth.”262 While prison reformers 
traditionally have counted on the support of unions in their opposition 
to private prisons, unions cannot be counted on as a consistent ally if 
their own financial interests would be enhanced through privatization. 
While California is the first state to consider this public-private 
alliance, described as “a détente between former foes,”263 as both public 
and private prison sectors face increased cutbacks due to decarceration 
measures, such alliances among the public and private sectors may gain 
traction in other jurisdictions. 
D. Culture as Resistance 
Aside from the economic interests described above, public and 
private sector actors may resist decarceration-era goals by propagating 
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an “us versus them” mentality that undermines efforts to improve 
prison conditions and to promote successful reentry.264 The architecture 
of prison life accentuates this separation between staff and inmates.265 
Prisoners are referred to by number rather than by name,266 and they 
are classified by “level of risk” based on their offense.267 Dress codes, 
prohibitions against fraternizing among inmates and officers, and the 
designation of publicly accessible amenities, such as restrooms and 
water fountains, as “staff only” may also contribute to this cultural 
separation in prisons.268 Seizing on the racialized aspects of mass 
incarceration, Jody Lewen, Executive Director of the Prison University 
Project at San Quentin, described practices such as delineating that a 
coffee machine is only for staff use as “taking the psychology of Jim 
Crow and superimposing it” in the prison context.269 
Officers, who are the individuals that interact most directly and 
frequently with inmates, may not support rehabilitative goals such as 
education.270 In fact, they may embrace the “us versus them” paradigm 
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to such an extent that they are unwilling to acknowledge shared 
interests with inmates. The ongoing controversy involving air 
conditioning in Texas prisons is illustrative. Among corrections officers 
in Texas, where summer temperatures can soar well into triple digits, 
there was significant resistance among correctional officers to 
improving prison conditions by installing air conditioning.271 A popular 
response by officers was, “we are going to help them?”272 This proposed 
improvement was also derided as amounting to a “hug a thug” 
program.273 And yet, when polled anonymously, 87% of the corrections 
officers in Texas claimed to want air-conditioned prisons, illustrating a 
tension between officers’ personal preferences and their desire to 
appear tough and to publicly distance their own needs from those of the 
inmates under their watch.274 
But officers may actually have much in common with inmates. 
Many of them come from the same neighborhoods and low-income 
backgrounds, and their jobs are widely considered undesirable.275 A 
common refrain during interviews with corrections leaders was that “no 
one working as a correctional officer grew up wanting to be one.”276 In 
fact, the job of “prison guard” consistently is ranked as one of the worst 
jobs in the United States—just below that of dishwasher.277 Studies 
have shown that working as a correctional officer is more likely to result 
in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than spending time in 
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 272.  Id. 
 273.  Id. (describing the “light bulb” that went on when he would explain to officers that they 
too would benefit from this reform).  
 274.  The Texas correctional officers’ union eventually adopted a platform supporting air 
conditioning in prisons, and they recently joined pending litigation challenging the lack of air 
conditioning in Louisiana prisons. Mike Ward, Guards to Join Convict Litigation Over Hot State 
Prisons, STATESMAN.COM (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/guards-to-join-
convict-litigation-over-hot-state-p/nZgSD [http://perma.cc/NZJ4-CYBM]; see also Lowry interview, 
supra note 28; Teetz interview, supra note 28. 
 275.  Lewen interview, supra note 28. 
 276.  See, e.g., Lowry interview, supra note 28 (observing, “they know their jobs are bad, but 
they don’t know why”). 
 277.  See, e.g., Best and Worst Jobs 2010, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/ 
public/resources/documents/st_BESTJOBS2010_20100105.html [http://perma.cc/9V56-RGNY]. 
Other countries, such as Norway, offer contrasting paradigms. In Norway, prison work is respected 
and considered social work; to be eligible for a job as a correctional officer in Norway, one needs 
extensive post-graduate training. Conway interview, supra note 28. 
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combat.278 Life expectancy for correctional officers is low, and suicide 
rates are high,279 as are divorce rates.280 
Just as prison reformers described the high level of discretion in 
disciplinary matters by correctional officers and their arbitrary 
(sometimes cruel) treatment of prisoners, so too union representatives 
described a similar unfettered discretion and associated arbitrariness 
by wardens and other prison management toward correctional 
officers.281 Union leaders described “heavy-handed” disciplining of 
employees, “hypocrisy” when wardens who were discovered in violation 
of prison rules were not subject to disciplinary measures,282 and the 
“power trip” enjoyed by some wardens who were likely to “intimidate 
employees” or discipline an officer for no stated reason, perhaps because 
“they may just not like an employee.”283 One union representative 
explained further that, if an officer questions what appears to be an 
arbitrary disciplinary measure, the warden may see this as challenging 
his authority, thus exacerbating an already tenuous relationship.284 
Another union leader noted that wardens, who have “aspirations to 
move up higher in the ranks,” sometimes “ask staff to cut corners.”285 
And when special treatment is afforded to wardens or where prison 
 
 278.  A study by the Desert Water Institute on PTSD and corrections officers showed that rates 
of PTSD for corrections officers is on par with Vietnam veterans and higher than for Gulf War 
veterans. Natasha Lennard, 31 Percent of Correctional Officers Have PTSD, SALON (Dec. 4, 2012, 
3:37 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/12/04/31_percent_of_correctional_officers_have_ptsd/ 
[http://perma.cc/VJW2-ZH8W]. 
 279.  See generally Steven Stack & Olga Tsoudis, Suicide Risk Among Correctional Officers: A 
Logistic Regression Analysis, 3 ARCHIVES OF SUICIDE RES. 183 (1997) (finding that “the risk of 
suicide among guards i[s] 39% higher than that of the rest of the working age population”). 
 280.  Oscar Lopez, Prison Officers Need Help, but They Won’t Ask for It, NEWSWEEK (May 27, 
2014), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/06/06/prison-officers-need-help-they-wont-ask-it-
252439.html [http://perma.cc/HEG7-8LGV].  
 281.  See, e.g., Baumann interview, supra note 28. 
 282.  For example, when an Arizona warden was found responsible in a sexual harassment 
case, the warden was not removed or seriously disciplined, but rather given “a slap on the wrist.” 
Blackmer interview, supra note 28. By contrast, correctional officers had been dismissed for what 
was widely perceived to be “the same infraction.” Id. 
 283.  In a survey of staff members at a private prison, in answer to the question, “What is the 
reason for the number of people quitting?” nearly twenty percent of employees cited “treatment by 
supervisors,” and seventeen percent listed “money.” Bates, supra note 6. Importantly, the two 
concerns expressed most by correctional officers’ unions were 1) pay (and how low pay resulted in 
turnover whenever the economy picked up); and 2) treatment of officers. See, e.g., Cantrell 
interview, supra note 28. Apparently these twin concerns pervade both public and private sectors. 
 284.  Lowry interview, supra note 28; see also Blackmer interview, supra note 28; Teetz 
interview, supra note 28. 
 285.  Blackmer interview, supra note 28. Officers explained that wardens are under a lot of 
pressure to perform so that they can move up the ranks, which may mean moving from a remote 
state prison to a more central location, or to promotion as a Deputy Director. Id. (noting that in 
Arizona a warden might imagine—quite correctly—that “if I screw up here, I’ll be stuck in Winslow 
and never make it back to Phoenix”).  
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management is understood to be above the law, this will “affect 
morale.”286 Cultural norms in prisons may begin with management, and 
when correctional officers perceive themselves to be mistreated and the 
victims of abuses of discretion, they may be more inclined to behave 
cruelly and to abuse their discretion in their interactions with 
inmates.287 This may further dehumanize inmates, jeopardizing their 
reentry prospects and thwarting decarceration-era goals. 
Meanwhile, one cannot expect the private prison culture to be 
more decarceration-friendly than that of the state with which it 
contracts. When inmates are routinely shipped hundreds or even 
thousands of miles away from their families and communities, despite 
evidence that doing so is highly disruptive to these families and 
communities, as well as to the inmate’s prospects for successful 
reentry,288 decarceration-era goals are thwarted. Further evidence of an 
anti-decarceration culture is the “race to the bottom,” which results 
when the state solicits bids from the private sector and prioritizes cost 
savings to such a degree that inmate services are essentially left out of 
the equation.289 Importantly, the state—through its institutional design 
choices—sets parameters in which the private sector must operate. 
Recalling one private prison executive’s analogy between selling 
hamburgers and selling prisons,290 there is a dominant strain of 
prisoner commodification that may be rampant in the private sector 
and reinforced by state contracts. Requirements of the private sector to 
 
 286.  Id. Others remarked that, in some prisons, nepotism is pervasive, describing a system of 
“good ol’ boy politics and nepotism” where “the warden’s son gets promoted.” Lowry interview, 
supra note 28. Union leaders were quick to point out that “we’ve had really good wardens too” and 
that these problems are not always present, but rather that the culture of prison management is 
highly impactful. Id. 
 287.  See, e.g., Michael Gilbert, The Illusion of Structure: A Critique of the Classical Model of 
Organization and the Discretionary Power of Correctional Officers, 22 CRIM. JUST. REV. 49, 53 
(1997) (emphasizing the importance of interpersonal interactions in prisons); Liebling, supra note 
144, at 340 (discussing the need for management role modeling such that staff can reflect their 
principles and expertise in their interactions with inmates).  
 288.  Johnna Christian, Riding the Bus: Barriers to Prison Visitation and Family Management 
Strategies, 21 J.  CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 31, 32–33 (2005). 
 289.  This “race to the bottom” is characterized by private and public sectors competing against 
each other with each striving to cut costs most, often at the expense of habitable facilities, let alone 
rehabilitative programs or services. See, e.g., Bates, supra note 6 (describing a race to the bottom 
in Tennessee where “the prison companies kept offering [the state] bigger and better deals,” and 
“[g]iven an opportunity to submit cost estimates anonymously, firms offered fantastic savings 
ranging from 30 percent to 50 percent. Threatened by the competition, even the state Department 
of Corrections went bargain basement, offering to slash its own already low cost by $70 million a 
year”); see also, Prince interview, supra note 28 (noting that the staffing pattern is set by the 
Request for Proposal (RFP) and determines, for example, how many inmates each case manager 
is assigned to, often upwards of one hundred offenders). 
 290.  See notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
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provide programs are generally minimal, and there is rarely 
meaningful oversight or recourse if contract terms are not met, because 
state facilities are already overcrowded so there is nowhere else for 
private-sector inmates to go. These design features exacerbate cultural 
resistance to decarceration-era goals. 
IV. OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION 
While there are powerful strains of resistance to reform among 
industry stakeholders, simplistic accounts of the monolithically hostile 
prison industry are incomplete. In fact, some industry actors have 
already begun adapting to the prospect of a new decarceration-era 
landscape, and even occasionally aligning with reformers. After 
examining early signs of adaptation and cooperation, this Part explores 
institutional design and cultural changes that would further promote 
decarceration-era goals. 
A. Early Examples of Adaptation 
1. Seizing New Business Opportunities 
Prison industry stakeholders could move away from the 
resistance model and instead assume an adaptive approach to a new 
decarceration-era landscape by exploring business opportunities in the 
broader corrections industry that create new streams of revenue, 
protecting them against a drop in incarceration. This would require 
industry stakeholders to anticipate trends in corrections. Ultimately, 
this approach may be particularly attractive to the private sector, which 
has strong incentives to be “one step ahead of policy” and the capacity 
to be “creative.”291 While the public sector has little choice regarding 
what markets to enter, the private sector will consider which subset of 
the corrections industry has the most growth potential. 
Private industry stakeholders have begun adapting to changing 
times by investing in surveillance, reentry, non-criminal detention, and 
probation,292 “looking at all streams to generate revenue” and pursuing 
the strategy of “grow or die.”293 For example, the GEO Group recently 
 
 291.  Mauer interview, supra note 28.  
 292.  While CCA and the GEO Group are tied to real estate by virtue of their corporate 
structure and therefore might be imagined less likely to diversify, as shown below, these 
corporations have already begun to pursue diversification strategies. See infra notes 294–96 and 
accompanying text. 
 293.  Cohen interview, supra note 28.  
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acquired Behavioral Interventions,294 a GPS monitoring company,295 
and CCA acquired Correctional Alternatives, a reentry service.296 Some 
private companies have also begun providing probation supervision.297 
In the immigration context, private-sector supervision programs have 
been used as an alternative to detention. For example, the GEO Group 
“uses a combination of ankle GPS monitoring systems and home visits 
to keep tabs on a suspected illegal immigrant.”298 
Electronic monitoring is increasingly popular as an alternative 
to incarceration for states that seek cost savings and a solution to 
overcrowded prisons.299 Some states have already enacted or are 
considering bills that would provide electronic monitoring for parolees 
as a way to save money and reduce overcrowding in prisons and jails.300 
 
 294.  Press Release, The GEO Grp., The GEO Group Closes $415 Million Acquisition of B.I. 
Incorporated (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110211005372/en/GEO-
Group-Closes-415-Million-Acquisition-B.I.#.VAc8x2SwI-8 [http://perma.cc/2S7X-NFP9] (noting 
that Behavioral Interventions is “the largest provider of comprehensive electronic monitoring 
services, tracking more than 60,000 offenders on behalf of approximately 900 federal, state and 
local correctional agencies located in all 50 states” and that the company is “the sole provider of 
monitoring and supervision services for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (‘ICE’) 
through the Intensive Supervision and Appearance Program (‘ISAP’), which is a core component 
of ICE’s Alternatives to Detention program”).  
 295.  Id. George Zoley, Chairman and CEO of GEO, has stressed his company’s efforts to 
diversify: “This important milestone further diversifies GEO and positions our company to meet 
the demand for increasingly diversified correctional, detention and treatment services in every 
state and for every federal detention and corrections agency in the United States.” Id. 
 296.  Press Release, Corrs. Corp. of Am., CCA Acquires Corrections Alternatives, Inc. (Aug. 5, 
2013), http://cca.com/press-releases/cca-acquires-correctional-alternatives-inc#.U78US61dXDE 
[http://perma.cc/3SUU-HN3K]. CCA described this “strategic acquisition” of CAI as a way to “grow 
and expand upon the community corrections business that CAI has developed.” Id.  
 297.  See, e.g., PRIV. PROB. SERVS., http://www.privateprobationservices.com/ 
[http://perma.cc/KG59-R5AR] (last visited Sept. 13, 2015); SATILLA PROB. MGMT. CORP., 
http://www.satillaprobation.com/ [http://perma.cc/EQ5W-RAV3] (last visited Sept. 13, 2015). 
 298.  Aubrey Pringle, The Winners in Immigration Control: Private Prisons, THE ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/08/the-winners-in-
immigration-control-private-prisons/279128/ [http://perma.cc/95NG-QJPQ]. 
 299.  See, e.g., Erika Slife, More Non-Violent Offenders Getting Home Monitoring in Cook 
County, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 5, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-10-05/news/chi-more-
nonviolent-offenders-getting-home-monitoring-in-cook-county-20111005_1_home-monitoring-
house-arrest-defendants [http://perma.cc/9AJ8-LLXC]. Patricia Caruso noted that part of 
Michigan’s strategy for decreasing the prison population involved significantly expanding the use 
of EM technologies; she described the $10 million investment in GPS as very successful in 
enhancing the comfort level of the parole board. Caruso interview, supra note 28 (relating that 
100% of sex offenders who are paroled in Michigan are now on GPS; that whereas the parole rate 
for sex offenders when she began her tenure with the Michigan Department of Corrections in 2003 
was 11%, it was 50% when she left in 2011; and that fewer than 5% of those paroled have been 
reincarcerated and none has been reincarcerated for a sex offense). Id. 
 300.  See, e.g., Rob Moritz, More Electronic Monitoring Could Relieve Prison Overcrowding, 
Prison Officials Say, ARK. NEWS BUREAU (Sept. 2, 2013), http://arkansasnews.com/sections/news/ 
arkansas/more-electronic-monitoring-could-relieve-prison-overcrowding-prison-officials 
[http://perma.cc/XB7Z-SFN6] (discussing Arkansas’ Act 570, which, in part, “made some 
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Approximately 200,000 individuals in the United States currently wear 
an electronic monitor (generally an ankle bracelet) as a condition of 
probation, parole, house arrest, or bail.301 The market for electronic 
monitoring continues to expand. In 2009, Behavioral Interventions 
signed a five-year, $372 million contract with U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) to monitor nearly 30,000 immigrants 
awaiting asylum or deportation hearings.302 
This diversification ensures that private prison companies will 
flourish even if the decarceration trend continues and U.S. prisons 
experience a further decline.303 At the same time, some private sector 
efforts to diversify may merely be an outgrowth of other efforts to 
thwart decarceration-era goals and should be closely scrutinized. For 
example, some private companies offering probation supervision tempt 
counties and municipalities with “a deal that sounds too good to be 
true—they will offer probation services in misdemeanor cases without 
asking for a single dime of public revenue.”304 In return, they demand 
“the right to collect fees from the probationers they supervise and that 
courts make probationers’ freedom contingent on paying those fees.”305 
While such offers may appeal to cash-strapped states, these states 
ultimately bear the responsibility for conflicts of interest that may arise 
when the profits of private companies are directly related to the fines 
they impose on probationers.306 In the absence of meaningful oversight 
to prevent abuse, such arrangements should be disfavored. 
 
nonviolent offenders eligible for parole earlier, with electronic monitoring as a condition of early 
release in some cases”).  
 301.  James Kilgore, Electronic Monitoring: Some Causes for Concern, PRISON LEGAL NEWS 
(Mar. 15, 2012), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2012/mar/15/electronic-monitoring-some-
causes-for-concern/ [http://perma.cc/E4J8-4AXH]. In California alone, 7,900 parolees designated 
as “high-risk,” most of whom are suspected gang members or on the sex offender registry, wear 
ankle bracelets. Paige St. John, Blind Spots in Electronic Monitoring of Sex Offenders, PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD (Mar. 31, 2013),  http://www.pressherald.com/2013/03/31/blind-spots-in-electronic-
monitoring_2013-04-01/ [http://perma.cc/226W-6C2Z]. 
 302.  Kilgore, supra note 301. The surveillance market has also infiltrated high schools. For 
example, iSECUREtrac, an electronic monitoring firm, recently funded a pilot monitoring project 
for high school students with truancy records in a predominantly black and Latino school district 
in Dallas, Texas. Id.  
 303.  While this adaptation may be seen as a form of cooperation, there are also negative 
ramifications to consider. Diversification by the private prison sector may result in the corrections 
industry’s expansion, even if certain inmate populations continue to decrease.  
 304.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Profiting from Probation (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/2014/02/05/profiting-probation-0 [http://perma.cc/8E8T-TTYJ]. 
 305.  Id. 
 306.  This conflict of interest is further exacerbated where the same private company manages 
the jail to which the probationer is sent, creating a win-win situation for the corporation.  
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2. Improving Working Conditions 
Unions have begun to realize that, while a stable prison 
population is in their interest, they also have much to gain from 
improved prison conditions. Problems associated with prison 
overcrowding affect inmates and prison industry professionals alike. 
Prison overcrowding has serious repercussions for the officers 
responsible for overseeing the facility, who may be increasingly 
subjected to violence when staffing ratios are low and conditions are 
poor.307 Thus, while officers would not want to see prisons empty out so 
much that there is a risk of closure, neither would they prefer the 
unlimited expansion of the prisoner population without an assurance 
that this increase is accompanied by the construction of additional 
facilities to house them and the hiring of additional officers. Rather, 
their preference for more prisoners is dependent on sufficient space and 
appropriate staffing ratios. 
Some officers may adapt to the new decarceration-era landscape 
by joining with prison reformers to address overcrowded conditions in 
prisons. In California, for example, the correctional officers’ union 
recently filed a brief in Brown v. Plata, alleging that prison 
overcrowding adversely affected those who work in California prisons 
as well as prison inmates.308 According to the brief, “CCOPA members’ 
daily work experiences reveal an overcrowded, inadequately staffed 
system that cannot deliver adequate medical care in spite of the best 
efforts of prison employees.”309 Officer Gary Benson explained that 
there were “way too many inmates in that small of a space to do the 
job.”310 Many California prisons were also short staffed; one union 
representative reported that, at the time of the Brown v. Plata 
litigation, the inmate population of the Norco prison where he worked 
was at 300% of capacity, and there was “no static staffing ratio,” 
meaning that when more inmates were added to the prison, there was 
no increase in staffing.311 While the focus of prison reformers tends to 
 
 307.  Reforming solitary confinement is another area that has garnered support from officers 
(through their unions), since solitary is widely understood to increase prisoner violence, which has 
a direct, negative effect on staff. See, e.g., Fathi interview, supra note 28 (describing the “gratuitous 
isolation” that reformers are trying to roll back in Texas, where everyone with a death sentence is 
put in solitary, and the union’s support for this reform).  
 308.  Brief for Appellee Intervenor Cal. Corr. Peace Officers’ Ass’n at 1–2, Schwarzenegger v. 
Plata, 130 S.Ct. 3413, (2010) (No. 09-1233) 2010 WL 4253495 at *1–2, Schwarzenegger v. Plata 
(2010) (No. 09-1233) (intervening on behalf of the 35,000 correctional officers in California). 
 309.  Id. at *11. 
 310.  Ridgeway & Casella, supra note 179. 
 311.  Baumann interview, supra note 28 (further adding that, at the start of the litigation, 
there were nine hundred mental health inmates at Norco and “not a single psychologist”).  
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be conditions for inmates, increasingly the deleterious effects of prison 
overcrowding on correctional officers and other prison workers has 
come to light,312 exposing opportunities for cooperation and coalition-
building. 
3. Co-opting Unions 
In some states, prison reformers have been able to reduce union 
pressure by absorbing correctional officer jobs into other related 
industries. The Michigan Department of Corrections’ recent efforts to 
reduce its prison population in the face of a powerful correctional 
officers’ union are illustrative. 
Michigan closed twenty prisons and, for the first fifteen closures, 
there was no need to lay off any officers and therefore no significant 
outcry from the union. How was this possible? According to Patricia 
Caruso, former Director of Michigan’s Department of Corrections who 
supervised these efforts for seven years, the Michigan corrections 
department anticipated these closures and stopped filling vacancies 
unless absolutely necessary. Dennis Schrantz, who oversaw the 
implementation of the Michigan Prisoner Reentry Initiative, which 
resulted in a 12% decrease in Michigan’s prison population, further 
explained that when filling a vacancy was necessary, the Department 
staffed that position with an officer who was already employed by the 
Department.313 
When Michigan prisons eventually closed, any remaining 
officers on staff were given the opportunity to continue working with 
the Department in another capacity, sometimes as probation or parole 
officers.314 Perhaps most surprisingly, given the tensions that often 
pervade management-union relations,315 the Department alerted the 
union sufficiently in advance so that union leaders could stand with 
 
 312.  While private prison corporations have not taken a public stand on prison conditions 
litigation, they too may benefit from court mandates (such as that in California) that require states 
to reduce prison overcrowding. While such court orders may result in some amount of 
decarceration, states may also find themselves more inclined to contract with the private sector as 
a way to fulfill the court mandate without risking public outcry related to the release of inmates 
(especially near an election year). Some have speculated that the primary motivation of the 
CCPOA for aligning with reformers in Brown v. Plata was to “get a seat at the table.” McDonald 
interview, supra note 28. By contrast, the Rhode Island union was entirely absent from recent 
negotiations about prison reform. Wall interview, supra note 28. 
 313.  Schrantz interview, supra note 28. 
 314.  Caruso interview, supra note 28 (noting that resistance was minimal because, “when 
people know they can put food on the table, it’s easier”). 
 315.  See generally PAUL BLYTON AND PETER TURNBULL, THE DYNAMICS OF EMPLOYEE 
RELATIONS (3d ed. 2004) (exploring the nature of employee relationships). 
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Department representatives for the public announcement.316 While the 
union may not have affirmatively supported these prison closings, 
Caruso noted that the transitions were relatively smooth and union 
leadership “never violated [the DOC’s] confidence.”317 The ultimate 
success of similar efforts to close prisons elsewhere may also depend on 
management-union relations, as well as on the ability of the state to 
absorb officers into other government jobs in that same community. 
B. Implications for Future Institutional Design Reform 
Some interests between reformers and prison industry 
stakeholders may already be positively aligned. Early examples of 
adaptation to the prospect of decarceration suggest that at least some 
stakeholders understand the writing on the wall—that a further decline 
in incarceration is likely and that it would behoove them to look for 
ways to profit from this new landscape. The challenge for policymakers 
who favor decarceration-era goals, and for reform advocates, is to 
determine how to most productively build on these synergies. 
This section offers some preliminary suggestions. It identifies 
and assesses institutional design reforms that might better align prison 
industry incentives with efforts to reduce the prison population, 
improve prison conditions, and promote rehabilitation—three 
cornerstone goals of contemporary prison reform. While these proposals 
are top-down approaches and would require political will, they take 
prison industry professionals’ incentives into account, thus avoiding 
some pitfalls of recent reform efforts. 
1. Decoupling Profit from Number of Prisoners 
At present, prison contracts follow a hotel model,318 so that the 
more prisoners housed by a private prison, the more profit for the 
corporation.319 Any effort to change the incentives of private prison 
corporations must begin by changing this model, which ties the fate of 
the prison industry to the number of people imprisoned by the state. So 
long as prisons operate on the same model as hotels, they will be driven 
by the same overriding motivation to maximize occupancy. 
 
 316.  Caruso interview, supra note 28. 
 317.  Id. But see Schrantz interview, supra note 28 (noting that, when Standish, the sixteenth 
prison to close during this time, was closed—and for all subsequent closures that involved layoffs—
there was picketing by the union and substantial outcry). 
 318.  As discussed previously, this hotel model may be modified by minimum occupancy 
guarantees. See supra notes 227–30 and accompanying text. 
 319.  Id. Even in a modified hotel model, private prisons have strong incentives to prefer more 
prisoners when they are paid per prisoner. 
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Instead, private prisons should be compensated based on a more 
realistic estimate of the fixed and marginal costs of running a prison. 
They should be guaranteed a certain amount per prison facility, 
regardless of how many inmates it contains. This facility fee should be 
supplemented by per-prisoner fees to compensate for the marginal cost 
of housing additional inmates. The crucial difference from the current 
situation is that these supplemental fees would only cover the marginal 
cost, thus substantially reducing or even eliminating the incentive to 
imprison as many inmates as possible. 
In addition, prisons should be compensated less for low-risk 
prisoners and more for adding prisoners with special needs.320 Again, 
this would eliminate the incentive for private prisons to skim off low-
cost, low-risk prisoners and to shun prisoners who might impose extra 
costs on a prison.321 If prisons were compensated more for higher-risk 
prisoners, perhaps they could devise better ways to house and treat 
them.322 This approach would also enable a fairer comparison between 
costs in different prisons by making the cost of housing different inmate 
populations more transparent.323 Finally, this approach would 
eliminate the danger that an average per-prisoner fee, combined with 
private prison efforts to skim off the lowest-cost prisoners, may 
 
 320.  At present, compensation in neither sector varies according to the needs of particular 
prisoners, their educational attainment or vocational training while in prison, or whether they end 
up back in prison within a day, a month, or a year of release. For a contrasting example in the 
medical field, see JUDITH MISTICHELLI, DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS (DRGS) AND THE 
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: FORECASTING SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 2 (1984) (describing the 
system of Diagnosis Related Groups in medicine, whereby patients are divided into “medically 
meaningful” groups according to their treatment needs and for purposes of Medicare 
reimbursement).  
 321.  The private sector has been widely criticized for cherry-picking those prisoners that are 
least expensive to house. See, e.g., Julia Bowling, Are Private Prisons Good Investments for States?, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/are-private-prisons-
good-investments-states [http://perma.cc/V4KN-9G39]. The educational sector provides a helpful 
analogue here: one concern raised about charter schools is their tendency to siphon off students 
that are wealthier and have fewer special needs. MARK WEBER & JULIA RUBIN, NEW JERSEY 
CHARTER SCHOOLS: A DATA-DRIVEN VIEW 4–5 (Oct. 29, 2014), 
http://www.saveourschoolsnj.org/save/corefiles/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/NJ-Charter-School-
Report_10.29.2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/45ZZ-P3Q8]. As a result of these dissimilar student 
populations, it is difficult to compare the performance of charter schools to their public 
counterparts. A better approach would calibrate vouchers to charter schools based on the expected 
difficulty of educating particular students in these schools. 
 322.  For example, if prisons were paid more to house mentally ill prisoners—assuming that 
there was also a requirement to provide treatment—this would provide an incentive to diagnose 
prisoners properly. To avoid over-diagnosis, a state psychologist could be responsible for 
diagnosing prisoners and would commit the prison to treatment programs as a condition of 
receiving extra funds. 
 323.  This approach is in harmony with Volokh’s suggestion that better performance measures 
be developed to determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of public and private-sector 
prisons. Volokh, supra note 20, at 375–77.  
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overcompensate private prisons for new inmates and encourage those 
prisons to maximize capacity. 
Of course, any change in modes of compensation might result in 
increasing overall payments to private prisons—particularly if private 
prisons end up being paid for half-empty prisons, or if private prisons 
change their focus to gain fees from more lucrative, high-risk 
prisoners.324 Conversely, this approach could save money if private 
prisons remain filled with low-risk prisoners. To the extent that prison 
reform advocates are concerned about the treatment of prisoners, a 
single-minded focus on limiting compensation for private prisons may 
be counterproductive, as discussions about how to warehouse people for 
the least possible cost are not conducive to the kind of reforms that are 
likely to lead to better prison conditions. 
Although these changes are most directly applicable to private 
prisons, which explicitly operate on a model where more prisoners 
means more income, they should be part of a shift that transforms 
public prisons as well. At present, public prisons are also viewed 
through the lens of cost-per-prisoner, irrespective of individual prisoner 
needs.325 For example, county jails have increasingly been tasked with 
housing overflow inmates from state prisons, and these counties are 
compensated on a per-prisoner basis.326 Furthermore, public corrections 
administrations may be assessed on their comparative efficiency in 
terms of cost-per-prisoner.327 Thus, reforming the cost-per-prisoner 
model could also improve the incentives of public prisons, moving them 
away from a warehousing paradigm. 
In some ways, these changes would move the industry toward a 
cost-plus model: compensating private prisons for their true costs to 
avoid encouraging them to increase incarceration. It would thus follow 
the lead of states that have applied the “decoupling model” to electricity 
and natural gas industries. Traditional utility rates compensate 
 
 324.  But even if this approach increased up-front costs, if it reduced incarceration rates by 
changing the incentives of private prison companies, it could save money by decreasing the number 
of prisoners, not to mention reducing the collateral consequences of prison for inmates, their 
families and communities. See supra Section I.A. 
 325.  See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., SPECIAL REPORT, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001 
(2004), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf [http://perma.cc/6622-GTQ9].  
 326.  See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNTIES, STATE PRISONERS IN COUNTY JAILS (2010), 
http://www.naco.org/newsroom/pubs/Documents/Health,%20Human%20Services%20and%20Just
ice/State%20Prisoners%20in%20County%20Jails%20Updated.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZDE2-LLEE] 
(noting, for example, that in Montana, “the state reimburses both county and regional jails for 
room, board, and routine medical expenses” and that “the per diem rate ranges by county from 
$48.00 - $56.00 for local jails”). 
 327.  CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT 
INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 9–10 (2012), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/ 
downloads/Price_of_Prisons_updated_version_072512.pdf [http://perma.cc/R7GY-KGJ9]. 
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utilities per unit of electricity or gas delivered, which means that 
utilities receive outsized profits when energy use unexpectedly 
increases.328 This model encourages utilities to maximize energy use, 
undercutting energy efficiency goals. Reformers have moved to roll back 
any excess profits due to increased energy, “decoupling” utility profits 
from energy use.329 This change means compensating utilities more for 
their fixed costs and less for their marginal costs, and the same 
approach could reduce private prisons’ incentive to incarcerate. 
Another analogous use of the “decoupling model” comes from the 
health-care sector and involves decoupling profits from the number of 
medical procedures performed. The fee-per-service model in the health-
care context has led to increased costs and overuse of medical 
procedures; recent Medicare reforms that decouple profits from the 
number of procedures are designed to promote an efficient use of 
services, rather than a maximizing use.330 Of course, efforts to increase 
efficiency and decouple profits from service provision in any of these 
contexts require new mechanisms for measuring outcomes, and the 
next section explores the possibility of using outcome metrics to 
compensate prisons to further improve their incentives. 
2. Paying for Performance 
Changes in compensation schemes would also drastically affect 
the orientation of institutional actors.331 In the prison context, the 
incentives of stakeholders would shift if the prison industry were 
compensated according to performance metrics. By connecting 
compensation to outcome measures, states could better align the 
incentives of prison industry stakeholders with decarceration-era 
goals.332 
 
 328.  James Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1357, 
1368 n.68 (2014).  
 329.  Id.  
 330.  See, e.g., Christopher Cheney, Medicare Unveils Alternative Payment Models, 
HEALTHLEADERSMEDIA (Jan. 27, 2015), http://healthleadersmedia.com/page-1/HEP-312576/ 
Medicare-Unveils-Alternative-Payment-Models [http://perma.cc/2MCV-3R6J]. 
 331.  See SHAHID BURKI & GUILLERMO PERRY, BEYOND THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS: 
INSTITUTIONS MATTER 5 (1998).  
 332.  Pay for performance measures might meet with union opposition (as in the teachers 
union context), see, e.g., Kevin Sieff, For Va.’s Proposed Teacher Merit-Pay Program, Few Hands 
in the Air, WASH. POST (June 22, 2011) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ education/for-vas-
proposed-teacher-merit-pay-program-few-hands-in-the-air/2011/06/22/AGzsZVgH_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/LH2W-HHWA], but it might also provide unions with leverage to negotiate higher 
salaries. Furthermore, unions should not object to calibrating vouchers to the private system based 
on the students in that system. Similarly, correctional officers should, if anything, prefer that 
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There are various models of “pay for performance,” which 
include partnerships between the state, private investors, and 
prisons.333 One approach that could be used in both the public and 
private sectors is a social impact bond.334 Using this approach, investors 
provide funds to a prison or associated non-profit that invests them in 
a prison reform project, such as reducing recidivism, and the 
government pays the investors back at a premium if the goals of the 
project are met.335 Social impact bonds arose in this context with a 
project in the United Kingdom at the Peterborough prison.336 Beginning 
in 2010, investors provided capital to be managed by a non-profit,337 
which contracted with a social work group to run anti-recidivism 
services.338 For this anti-recidivism program to be considered a success, 
the reconviction rate must be 7.5% less than the matched comparison 
group.339 If the program “works,” the British government repays the 
capital plus 9% interest.340 The likelihood of success and the price of the 
bonds were determined based on the prior success rate of the service 
organization.341 If the project is unsuccessful, the investors receive 
nothing and the taxpayers pay nothing.342 As of 2013, the Ministry of 
 
distinctions are made between high- and low-cost inmates, and that payment is calibrated 
accordingly.  
 333.  For a proposal that would use prisoner feedback through a voucher system to determine 
market success, see Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 779 (2012). However, 
giving prisoners that degree of choice is likely politically infeasible and Volokh acknowledges 
various weaknesses of this proposal that may be dispositive, e.g., market failure arguments 
suggesting that prison quality would not likely improve, and market success arguments suggesting 
that satisfying prisoner preferences may harm society, for example, by allowing gang members to 
choose the same prison. Id. at 824, 838–40. A pay for success model does not suffer from these 
same limitations. 
 334.  See Social Impact Bonds: An Overview, SOCIAL FINANCE 4–5 (2012) (exploring how social 
impact bonds can mobilize private capital to advance social good). 
 335.  Alan Travis, Will Social Impact Bonds Solve Society’s Most Intractable Problems?, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/oct/06/social-impact-bonds-
intractable-societal-problems [http://perma.cc/38QS-43ZR]. 
 336.  Private Backers Fund Scheme to Cut Prison Reoffending, BBC NEWS (Sept. 10, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-11254308 [http://perma.cc/D8TT-N4DM]. 
 337.  Social Impact Bonds: An Overview, supra note 334, at 8. 
 338.  Id. 
 339.  Id. at 9. The measure under comparison is reconviction rate for twelve months after each 
prisoner is released. Prison Payment-by-Results Schemes See Reoffending Cut, BBC NEWS (June 
13, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-22886395 [http://perma.cc/U57D-ZXQD]. 
 340.  Judith Rodin, President of the Rockefeller Foundation and a strong supporter of social 
impact bonds, explained, “the government could pay 9 percent because the recidivism rate would 
be reduced so significantly [it would still save the government money].” Paul Solman, How Modern 
Finance Promises to Break the Cycle of Recidivism, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/how-modern-finance-promises-to/ [http:// perma.cc/ 
AXB5-782C]. 
 341.  Id. 
 342.  Social Impact Bonds: An Overview, supra note 334, at 10–12.  
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Justice announced interim figures showing a 6% decline in recidivism 
among a cohort of one hundred Peterborough prisoners.343 By contrast, 
recidivism increased 16% nationally.344 
Social impact bonds modeled after the Peterborough experiment 
were recently introduced in the United States. In September 2013, the 
U.S. Department of Labor announced that it would fully fund similar 
“Pay for Success” programs in Massachusetts and New York.345 The 
New York experiment involves a collaboration between private 
investors—most notably Bank of America Merrill Lynch, which raised 
$13.2 million of the $13.5 million—and the Center for Employment 
Opportunities, which is providing employment training and job 
placement assistance services to two thousand individuals with a high 
risk of recidivism.346 Success requires that recidivism is reduced by 8% 
in the test group or that employment increases by 5%,347 with more 
successful outcomes leading to higher returns for investors.348 
Massachusetts is the other beneficiary of a U.S. Department of 
Labor grant. Its program funds a non-profit, Roca, in its attempts to 
serve 929 men in Massachusetts through “intensive outreach, life skills 
and employment training that will reduce recidivism.”349 The 
investment totals $27 million,350 with Third Sector Capital Partners 
raising $18 million in private financing.351 Success will be determined 
based on reductions in the number of days the men spend in jail, as well 
 
 343.  Isabelle de Grave, Social Impact Bond Has Reduced Reoffending Says Ministry of Justice, 
PIONEERS POST (June 14, 2013), http://www.pioneerspost.com/news/20130614/social-impact-bond-
has-reduced-reoffending-says-ministry-of-justice [http://perma.cc/362F-PJWB]. 
 344.  Id.  
 345.  News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Labor Department Awards Nearly $24 Million 
in Pay For Success Grants (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/eta/ 
ETA20131936.htm [http://perma.cc/9GQP-ZS57]. 
 346.  Press Release, Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor of N.Y., Governor Cuomo Announces New 
York the First State in the Nation to Launch Pay for Success Project in Initiative to Reduce 
Recidivism (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/12302013-pay-for-success-project 
[http://perma.cc/X96V-K2JD]. 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  Id. (explaining further that the state raised funds for the potential payout through 
appropriations and through a $12 million grant from the Department of Labor).  
 349.  Press Release, Office of Governor Deval L. Patrick, Mass. Exec. Dep’t, Massachusetts 
Launches Landmark Initiative to Reduce Recidivism Among At-Risk Youth (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/207401/ocn795183245-2014-01-29.pdf 
?sequence=1 [http://perma.cc/WS3N-QFLU]. 
 350.  A thorough cost-benefit analysis of the Department of Labor grant is beyond the scope of 
this Article. However, questions of comparative cost (as well as concerns about how to fund future 
such partnerships) are central to the viability of social impact bonds and a subject for future 
research. 
 351.  Press Release, Office of Governor Patrick, supra note 349; Elkins interview, supra note 
28 (noting that Roca was inspired by the Peterborough Project). 
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as improvements in their “employment and job readiness.”352 The 
project will last seven years, and the “success payments,” if any, will be 
funded by money appropriated by Massachusetts, as well as $11.7 
million from the Department of Labor grant.353 If the project is 
successful, Roca will add an additional 391 men over nine years.354 
Goldman Sachs was an early funder—the bank’s involvement is part of 
its impact investing initiative—and Roca leadership noted that the 
private investment in this instance had “little to do with corrections.”355 
Another partner in this investment is the Arnold Foundation, a 
government accountability group seeking transparency and changing 
“business as usual.”356 Notably, this partnership may have had more to 
do with building an “impact investing” field and increasing 
transparency than with prison reform.357 This suggests that potential 
buy-in for future social impact bonds in the prison context may be 
broader than one might initially imagine, even if a broad-based cultural 
shift is lagging.358 
Expanding the use of social impact bonds would require that (1) 
there are workable strategies for stakeholders to achieve prison reform 
goals, and (2) achievement of these goals could be measured. Even when 
workable strategies are theoretically possible, they may not be feasible 
due to a lack of local expertise. For example, while there was much 
interest on the part of the Department of Corrections when the 
possibility of social impact bonds was broached in Rhode Island, 
ultimately there was no traction because the non-profit corrections 
sector was deemed insufficiently robust, and there was no organization 
with sufficient capacity to support the initiative.359 
In addition to social impact bonds, other innovative 
compensation schemes could also reward positive outcomes while 
mitigating stakeholder preferences for an expansion of the prison 
population. For example, states could experiment with paying bonuses 
to prisons for outcomes such as lowered recidivism and better 
employment outcomes for former inmates. These bonuses would, of 
course, need to compensate for differences in the population of each 
prison to set an appropriate baseline for measuring improvement. 
 
 352.  Press Release, Office of Governor Patrick, supra note 349. 
 353.  Id. 
 354.  Id. 
 355.  Elkins interview, supra note 28. 
 356.  Id. 
 357.  Id.  
 358.  See supra Section III.D. 
 359.  Wall interview, supra note 28. 
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The health care context provides a useful analogue.  Accountable 
care organizations (ACOs), which are “networks of physicians and other 
providers that could work together to improve the quality of health care 
services and reduce costs for a defined patient population,”360 are “given 
financial incentives to cooperate and save money by avoiding 
unnecessary tests and procedures,”361 and compensation is provided 
according to performance. ACOs are entitled to keep part of the 
Medicare savings they generate through more efficient management of 
health care for their patients,362 and an initial measurement of expected 
cost of service provision for each patient enables a determination of 
whether the ACO managed to meet or even surpass expectations. 
3. Encouraging Diversification by Industry Stakeholders 
Another way to promote cooperation between prison industry 
stakeholders and reformers would be to encourage private prison 
corporations and unions to diversify their expertise into such related 
markets as treatment, rehabilitation, education, and diversionary 
approaches.363 Diversified stakeholders would be less adamantly 
opposed to decarceration because they would also benefit from 
alternative programs designed to reduce incarceration.364 For example, 
just as some private companies are already investing in electronic 
monitoring,365 they could also be motivated to invest in rehabilitative 
and reentry programs, such as step-down approaches366 and treatment 
for substance abuse or mental illness. Coalition builders looking to 
accomplish prison reform should encourage prison industry 
stakeholders to invest in these related markets. 
 
 360.  Mark Merlis, Accountable Care Organizations (Updated), HEALTH AFFAIRS (Aug. 13, 
2010), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=23 [http://perma.cc/ 
4ZAA-LGTY]. 
 361.  Jenny Gold, FAQ on ACOs: Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014), http://khn.org/news/aco-accountable-care-organization-faq/ 
[http://perma.cc/V62G-9HW4]. 
 362.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012). 
 363.  In the private-sector context, policymakers are in regular contact with private industry 
leaders and could suggest that companies looking to outlast their decarceration policies will need 
to diversify their business by investing in anti-recidivism and other programs that could expand 
consistent with decarceration initiatives. According to the chief executive of the Corrections 
Corporation of America, government clients are already “pushing CCA and other private operators 
to save them money by reducing recidivism,” and CCA plans to respond by expanding its 
rehabilitation programs and reentry services. Devlin Barrett, Prison Firm CCA Seeks to Reduce 
Number of Repeat Offenders, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/ prison-
firm-cca-seeks-to-reduce-number-of-repeat-offenders-1410561176 [http://perma.cc/BX45-G3DZ].  
 364.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 365.  See supra, notes 293–94 and accompanying text. 
 366.  See infra, notes 368–71 and accompanying text. 
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Early examples of diversification by the electricity industry in 
distributed solar provision are illustrative. The industry may, of course, 
strive to eliminate competition from distributed solar despite its 
environmental benefits. Yet established industry stakeholders, 
including Edison International and Duke Energy, perhaps seeing what 
the future could hold, have already begun investing in distributed solar 
companies.367 This investment among established utilities companies in 
new forms of electricity could serve as a model for prison industry 
stakeholders considering an investment in rehabilitative programs that 
would complement governmental efforts to reduce the U.S. prison 
population. 
Step-down programs provide one possible avenue for increased 
prison industry investment and alternative employment for corrections 
officers.368 In step-down programs, inmates are moved gradually from 
more secure facilities (and more isolation and dependency) to less 
secure facilities where they have more autonomy.369 Such programs 
provide further opportunities for private-sector management and 
correctional officers to be employed in developing more innovative 
approaches than mere warehousing. These programs may be 
particularly crucial in the administrative segregation context, where 
the practice of releasing inmates directly from solitary confinement has 
led to tragic consequences. In one such case, Tom Clements, the former 
Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, was 
murdered by a parolee “who had spent almost his entire eight-year 
prison term in solitary confinement before being released directly onto 
the streets.”370 In Texas, more than one thousand inmates each year are 
 
 367.  See, e.g., SEPA Comments on Utility Investments in Distributed Solar Companies, SEPA, 
https://www.solarelectricpower.org/about-sepa/sepa-news/press-releases/sepa-comments-on-
utility-investments-in-distributed-solar-companies.aspx [http://perma.cc/E44N-HP6W]: 
The investments of Edison International, Duke Energy and NextEra in distributed 
solar companies demonstrate that these forward-looking companies recognize the 
important role that solar will play in the future of the energy industry. Customers are 
increasingly being presented with energy choices, including solar, which foreshadow 
that the role of the electric utility is likely to shift. Utility holding companies are getting 
in front of the change and preparing their businesses for continued success. 
 368.  Importantly, policymakers and reformers in favor of decarceration-era goals should 
prefer diversification in both private and public sectors; in the private sector, this diversification 
would take the form of market diversification, while in the public sector, it would take the form of 
labor diversification. In the public-sector context, this may require providing further training for 
correctional officers (who generally are required only to possess a high school diploma or GED) to 
prepare them for other jobs in corrections. See infra Section IV.B.4. 
 369.  See, e.g., Step Down Program, CAL. DEP’T OF CORRS. AND REHAB., 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/rehabilitation/step-down-program.html [http://perma.cc/CU3G-BXVQ] 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 370.  Christopher Moraff, Can Europe Offer the U.S. a Model for Prison Reform?, NEXT CITY, 
(June 19, 2014), http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/us-prisons-reform-european-prisons-model 
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released directly from administrative segregation onto the street.371 
Step-down programs may also play an important role when an inmate 
transitions from the general prison population to community 
supervision or release. 
Some states have begun experimenting with step-down 
programs to aid the reentry process.372 New Jersey recently invested in 
transitional facilities to ease the move from prison to parole, partnering 
with Community Education Centers (CEC), a private company, to 
develop an innovative parole diversionary program.373 New Jersey 
requires all individuals to spend time in a CEC transitional facility 
before being transferred to a halfway house.374 According to a member 
of the CEC Executive Team, the nomenclature—which focuses on 
“education” as opposed to “corrections”—is not accidental. Employees of 
CEC are expected to refer to “residents,” not “inmates,” and to address 
each resident formally, e.g., “Mr. Smith.” CEC facilities house residents 
for sixty to ninety days. The first thirty days are designated as an 
orientation period, which includes individual assessment. Each 
resident is assigned to a counselor as well as to a more senior resident 
or “big brother.” Residents participate in programs that address such 
issues as anger management and domestic violence. The programs are 
named to deemphasize the negative aspects of these needs and to 
accentuate the positive, hoped-for outcomes, such as the course on 
 
[http://perma.cc/6G2S-4CA3] (noting that, in a cruel, ironic twist, Clements had returned barely a 
month before from a trip sponsored by the Vera Institute to study prison systems in Germany and 
the Netherlands, countries known for their rehabilitative approaches and low recidivism rates). 
 371.  Lowry interview, supra note 28. This phenomenon also raises broader concerns about the 
use of administrative segregation, including when it should be used, for how long, and what 
necessary procedural protections and opportunities for review should exist. The American 
Corrections Association, deeming this issue of pressing concern, devoted four recent plenary 
sessions to discussion of the issue at its annual meetings. American Corrections Association, 
Annual Conference Schedule (2014) (on file with author). 
 372.  As in medicine, where step-down units are widely used, cost savings are key. In the 
prison context, cost savings could result from a need for less security on the front end or lower 
recidivism rates on the back end. One private company has claimed both front-end savings (i.e. 
$70 per day as compared with $112.50 per day in a public facility) and back-end savings (i.e. a 30% 
reduction in recidivism rate within one year of release). Press Release, Cmty. Educ. Ctrs., CEC 
Expands Services at Bo Robinson (June 26, 2006), http://www.cecintl.com/ news_2006_29.html 
[http://perma.cc/5CGN-RQ3E]. Presumably, step-down approaches will be viable long-term only if 
cost savings are documented. For a related example of the front-end cost savings model in the 
medical context, see Elizabeth Douglas, Patients With Sleep Apnea Monitored Safely in Step-Down 
Unity, 31 ANESTHESIOLOGY NEWS 10 (Oct. 2005), 
http://www.anesthesiologynews.com/ViewArticle.aspx?d_id=1&a_id=2800 [http://perma.cc/H3RP-
ZQCP]. 
 373.  Fretz interview, supra note 28. 
 374.  Id.; see also Caren Chesler, Ready for Reentry?, NEW JERSEY MONTHLY (Oct. 11, 2010), 
http://njmonthly.com/articles/lifestyle/ready-for-re-entry.html [http://perma.cc/L8MB-5ZDE]. 
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“healthy relationships.”375 Approximately five hundred residents are 
divided into three units, which bear the names Serenity, Tranquility, 
and Harmony.376 Among the staff are psychologists, social workers, and 
drug and alcohol counselors, as well as former residents.377 CEC 
supports an alumni program that sponsors regular meetings and a 
popular annual alumni picnic, which routinely attracts more than one 
thousand current and former residents.378 
Another business opportunity for prison corporations and 
officers’ unions is mental illness and substance abuse programs. While 
the problem of mental illness in prisons is pervasive,379 correctional 
officers receive scant training in dealing with mental health patients.380 
Improving and increasing training for staff about mental illness is a 
necessary first step.381 So is ensuring that mentally ill inmates receive 
the appropriate medications. While many inmates with mental 
illnesses can function well when medicated, when off their medication, 
they may act out in dangerous ways, threatening not only their own 
lives but also the lives of other inmates and the correctional officers.382 
In the words of one former correctional officer, “psychotropic meds make 
these guys normal and nice; if you take them off meds, they turn into 
 
 375.  Fretz interview, supra note 28. 
 376.  Id. 
 377.  Id. 
 378.  Townes interview, supra note 28. 
 379.  See, e.g., Inmate Mental Health, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH (2004), 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/prevalence/inmate-mental-health.shtml 
[http://perma.cc/A2NV-2ZJD] (finding that more than half of state prison inmates suffered from 
mental illness). The problem of mentally ill inmates was also mentioned in nearly every interview 
conducted with corrections department leaders and corrections officers as one of the most 
significant impediments to reform. See, e.g., McDonald interview, supra note 28. 
 380.  See, e.g., Teetz interview, supra note 28 (noting that, in Texas, officers used to receive 
three hours of mental health training, but in recent years, this training has been cut back to 1.5 
hours); see also Lewen interview, supra note 28 (describing the lack of training for officers about 
dealing with people in a psychotic state and a devastating example when an inmate who was 
undergoing a psychotic episode grabbed a pen and lunged at an officer, later to be charged with 
attempted murder and sent to solitary confinement for three years); Lowry interview, supra note 
28 (referring to the Harris County jail as “the largest treatment center in Texas”). 
 381.  A conventional prison environment may be particularly detrimental to those who suffer 
from mental illness, all the more so where officers lack even rudimentary training about this 
population. As one former correctional officer observed, in the “free world,” if an individual talks 
to himself, it might not attract much attention; conversely, in the “rule-based” prison context, that 
same individual might be placed in solitary confinement for continued rule violations. Lowry 
interview, supra note 28. While solitary confinement is often considered a place for only the most 
violent offenders, in practice, it is used more widely and often houses many mentally ill inmates. 
Jeffrey Metzner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical 
Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 104, 104 (2010), http://www.jaapl.org/content/ 38/1/104.full 
[http://perma.cc/NJ4M-QMYX]. 
 382.  Lowry interview, supra note 28. 
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Hannibal Lector.”383 Yet even where inmates are regularly taking their 
medications, psychotropic drugs are heat-reactive, rendering them 
ineffective if subjected to extreme heat.384 This is of particular concern 
in states like Texas and Louisiana, which routinely experience high 
levels of heat and humidity and have prisons that are not air-
conditioned.385 Staff members have particularly strong incentives to 
prefer temperate conditions in prisons and appropriate medications for 
those under their supervision, as these factors may be crucial to their 
personal safety.386 
4. Changing Prison Culture 
Mitigating resistance to decarceration-era goals may require 
more than merely changing the financial incentives of prison industry 
stakeholders. The warehousing mentality in the private sector and the 
“us versus them” conception of correctional officers may prevent both 
sectors from pursuing opportunities that align with the goals of prison 
reformers.387 For executives thinking about inmates as undifferentiated 
product,388 it may be difficult to imagine how they could profit by 
treating prisoners as individuals capable of rehabilitation and 
contributing productively to society. Similarly, the “us versus them” 
mentality of correctional officers may impede them from seeing areas, 
such as prison conditions, where their interests are already aligned 
with inmates. To overcome these cultural roadblocks, the prison 
industry may need to move to a service model, like those long practiced 
in the educational, medical, and social work professions.389 Each of 
these fields has significant experience with the characteristic promise 
 
 383.  Id. 
 384.  Id.; see also Jeff Strickler, Unrelenting Heat Can Wither Your Meds, Too, STAR TRIB., 
(July 22, 2012), http://www.startribune.com/lifestyle/health/163361126.html [http://perma.cc/ 
BP2F-LFUY]. 
 385.  See supra, notes 271–74 and accompanying text. 
 386.  Without a court order, however, improving conditions in prisons is unlikely to be a high 
priority for politicians. See, e.g., Baumann interview, supra note 28 (“We need litigation for 
everything.”). 
 387.  In red and blue states alike, prison industry stakeholders, including those who had spent 
time in law enforcement, referred to prisons as particularly resistant to change. See, e.g., Baumann 
interview, supra note 28; Lowry interview, supra note 28. 
 388.  See supra, note 7 and accompanying text. 
 389.  See, e.g., Serving a Diverse Public, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Mar. 2013), 
http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/policy/diversity-preparation.aspx; Kim Jones, What is the 
Purpose of Education?, FORBES.COM (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2012/08/15/ 
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and pitfalls of public and private approaches. However, unlike these 
contexts, a more fundamental shift in norms and aims of the prison 
industry may be necessary to change the institutional culture of 
prisons.390 
Reimagining and humanizing inmates is a necessary first step 
for prison industry stakeholders, who could eventually benefit from a 
service model in the prison context. Corrections leaders have remarked 
that an ability to imagine people in prison as family members (or 
friends’ family members) is crucial to changing prison culture.391 One 
union leader explained that, when he addresses correctional officers, he 
asks them to keep in mind that “the person next to you probably has a 
relative in prison.”392 Another corrections leader suggested that one 
perversely “positive” result of high incarceration rates is that “people 
know people who have been incarcerated,” and they may increasingly 
be able (and willing) to distinguish between “a bad decision” and “a bad 
person.”393 Some have attributed subtle, progressive shifts in the 
policies of California’s correctional officers’ union to the tenure of a new 
union president whose teenage son had run-ins with law enforcement 
and the criminal justice system.394 Reimagining prisoners as “related” 
may also be crucial to continuing and expanding momentum for 
decarceration-era goals among a broader audience. One reformer 
described the need to “rehumanize prisoners in the public imagination,” 
and to break apart the “psychic function of prisoners” as lower than 
ourselves.395 
Aside from recontexualizing prisoners as “one of us,” another 
complementary approach would be to fundamentally transform the role 
 
 390.  The utilities sector may have required a shift almost as great because of the historic 
presumption of industry stakeholders that their mission was to increase consumption of electricity. 
The entrance to the Seattle City Light Building once showcased a mural suggesting that power 
should be used as though it were free. It read: “That Man May Use It Freely as the Air He Breathes, 
the Waters of the Rivers, the Winds of Heaven.” Seattle Art & Seek, Water Into Electricity, 
WAYMARKING (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.waymarking.com/waymarks/  
WM4CJ7_Water_Into_Electricity [http://perma.cc/K737-NW6M]. Yet while providing power is a 
priority (and of obvious benefit), it is also a priority to decrease the use of electricity because of the 
high cost of production as well as the pollution associated with power production and consumption. 
 391.  Fretz interview, supra note 28 (noting that, if someone had a personal experience—such 
as a family member in the system—“it hits home”). 
 392.  Lowry interview, supra note 28. 
 393.  Caruso interview, supra note 28 (observing, however, the persistence of a strain of 
discourse that insists there should be no redemption for inmates, including for those who 
committed crimes as juveniles, and that “they need to die in prison”). 
 394.  Sasha Abramsky, Walk the Line: Mike Jimenez’s Personal Turning Point Puts His 
Corrections Union at a Crossroads, NEWSREVIEW.COM (June 26, 2008), 
http://www.newsreview.com/sacramento/walk-the-line/content?oid=684901 [http://perma.cc/ 
U8CD-R7UK]. 
 395.  Lewen interview, supra note 28. 
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(and thus the interests) of correctional officers, such as by involving 
them more as part of a correctional team.396 Officers have a unique 
perspective regarding the needs of individual inmates, and they may be 
well-situated to advise management regarding which inmates are most 
likely to succeed upon release and whose sentences might reasonably 
be commuted. In Michigan, for example, where the former governor was 
open to commuting sentences, correctional officers were asked about 
particular inmates, and some reported “this is a waste of a bed” based 
on their experience.397 According to Caruso, former Director of the 
Michigan Department of Corrections, drawing on officer expertise was 
crucial to distinguishing between “people we’re afraid of” and “people 
we’re mad at.”398 
Ideally, prison work would be entirely reconceptualized as social 
work.399 Officers would be given more responsibility (and taught the 
necessary skills to effectively exercise such responsibility), such that 
they would take pride in their work. As in medicine and education, the 
goal would be excellence in service provision as assessed by outcome 
measures. While it is unrealistic to expect such a dramatic shift 
overnight, if, over time, there were fewer prisoners, it would be possible 
to invest more money in rehabilitating each prisoner and in training for 
officers. Such training could be geared toward helping officers develop 
particular reentry-related expertise and equipping them with the 
necessary skills to successfully implement new programs. 
Specific training and the resulting expertise is necessary for 
correctional officers to feel comfortable in an environment that 
demands more than mere warehousing. Such expertise is often lacking 
in the United States, where government employees may be viewed as 
interchangeable across sectors and are transferred regularly between 
them. For example, the former director of Caltrans, the California 
Department of Transportation, recently moved across sectors to become 
the rehabilitation point person at San Quentin State Prison.400 
 
 396.  By analogy, in the medical context, there is an expectation of a “health care team” and 
the idea that a focus on the development and coordination of this team can improve the quality of 
treatment while also saving money for the hospital. See, e.g., Primary Care for the 21st Century: 
Ensuring a Quality, Physician-led Team for Every Patient, AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS (Sept. 
18, 2012), http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/about_us/initiatives/AAFP-
PCMHWhitePaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/4GGQ-RZMQ]. 
 397.  Caruso interview, supra note 28.  
 398.  Id.  
 399.  Some prison reform advocates analogized prisons to other sectors involving the provision 
of social services, for example foster care and mental health, where “the key is changing people’s 
circumstances.” See, e.g., Cohen interview, supra note 28.  
 400.  Lewen interview, supra note 28. 
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A comparative lens reveals that a more professionalized, sector-
specific model for corrections workers has already gained traction 
elsewhere in the world. For example, in Germany and the Netherlands, 
prisons are staffed with social workers, mental health professionals, 
and attorneys.401 And unlike in the United States, those working in 
prisons receive extensive training before being placed on a cellblock.402 
German and Dutch corrections systems also favor rehabilitation over 
retribution, and they prioritize keeping inmates connected to their 
families and communities and preparing them to reenter society.403 
Some states may be taking preliminary steps to import a new, 
more “therapeutic” culture into U.S. prisons. In 2013, leaders of the 
departments of corrections in Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Georgia 
traveled to Germany and the Netherlands on a “fact-finding trip” 
sponsored by the Vera Institute of Justice.404 According to Kellie Wasko, 
a former warden and current deputy director of Colorado’s corrections 
department, Colorado’s department plans to take steps to “begin 
training corrections staff in client-centered counseling techniques in an 
effort to bring her staff more in line with European standards.” She 
further explained, “We can’t replace all of our supervisors with 
attorneys and social workers, but we can start changing their mentality 
to show inmates that we’re here to advocate for them.”405 
While changing the culture of an institution is difficult, it is not 
impossible. Patricia Caruso explained that, as a warden in Michigan, “I 
never questioned what our role was in locking people up. For years and 
years, I never questioned it. . . . I saw that population going up, up, up, 
up, and it never said anything to me other than that was the way it was, 
that we couldn’t change that. And now, I know for sure that that’s not 
true.” Caruso attributed the success of the Michigan Prisoner Reentry 
Initiative to “a huge culture change,” as prison industry professionals 
began “to look at our role in this whole continuum of the criminal justice 
spectrum and figure out that we had a much larger role to play than 
 
 401.  Subramanian & Shames, supra note 127, at 14; see also Conway interview, supra note 
28 (describing the retired Attica Warden’s recent visit to prisons in Finland, Sweden, and Norway, 
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graduates, and Finland’s Hameenlinnan Vankila Prison, which employed 140 staff members to 
oversee 160 inmates).    
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just [keeping the lid on the joint].”406 Reforming prisons may require 
precisely this sort of cultural transformation: a radical expansion of the 
role, outlook, and self-image of prison industry professionals. 
CONCLUSION 
Mass incarceration has been one of the most salient policy 
failures of the past half-century. Current momentum toward 
decarceration-era goals has created newfound hope that this problem 
can be addressed. However, the success of contemporary prison reform 
efforts may hinge on changing both the financial incentives and the 
cultural outlook of the prison industry. This article uncovers the 
motivations of prison industry actors and their modes of resistance to 
reform. In doing so, it is a crucial first step toward shifting the 
incentives of industry stakeholders and accomplishing the goals of 
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